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Abstract
In developed democracies, incumbents are consistently found to have an electoral advantage over
their challengers. The normative implications of this phenomenon depend on its sources. Despite
a large existing literature, there is little consensus on what the sources are. In this three-paper
dissertation, I nd that both electoral institutions and the parties behind the incumbents appear
to have a larger role than the literature has given them credit for, and that in the U.S. context,
between 30 and 40 percent of the incumbents' advantage is driven by their \scaring o" serious
opposition.
In \Voting for Parties or for Candidates: Do Electoral Institutions Make a Dierence?" I analyze
the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) data to put the U.S. case in a comparative
context and explore the impact of electoral institutions on voting behavior. My ndings suggest
that electoral institutions have a substantial eect on the degree to which politics is party-oriented
or personalistic, and thus, they might in turn have an impact on the level of incumbency advantage
in the elections.
In \How Parties Help Their Incumbents Win: Evidence from Spain," I explore a novel dataset
of elections to the Spanish Senate, where the commonly studied sources of incumbency advantage
are unlikely to be present and where we can use a precise measure of incumbency advantage. I nd
that the main source of the senator's advantage comes from their placement on the ballot by their
party leaders.
In \Challenger Quality and the Incumbency Advantage," my co-authors and I provide estimates
of the incumbency advantage and the eect of previous oce-holding experience that account for
the strategic entry in the race by high-quality challengers. For that purpose, we use term limits
as an instrument for challenger quality. Studying U.S. state legislatures, we nd that between 30
and 40 percent of the incumbency advantage in state legislative races is the result of scaring o
experienced challengers.
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1
Introduction
This dissertation, \Electoral Institutions, Party Strategies, Candidate Attributes, and the Incum-
bency Advantage," consists of three papers exploring the potential causes of the electoral advantage
incumbents enjoy over their challengers and how the nature and extent of this advantage vary de-
pending on electoral institutions.
In developed democracies, incumbents are consistently found to have an electoral advantage over
their challengers. For example, in the 1990s the mere fact of being the incumbent in the race
conferred on members of the U.S. Congress about 8 percentage points of the vote (Ansolabehere
and Snyder, 2002). The normative ramications of this phenomenon depend on its sources. If
incumbents fare better than their challengers at the polls simply because they are better candidates,
we would perceive their advantage as a sign of a healthy democracy. If the electoral advantage of
incumbents comes from their exploiting oce resources to deter high-quality challengers, however,
then the incumbents' advantage would diminish the accountability and competitiveness of the
elections and have negative consequences for representation. Despite a large existing literature,
there is little consensus on what the sources are.
Ever since Erikson (1971, 1972) and Mayhew (1974) noted the growing margins by which in-
cumbents were being reelected in the mid 1960s, researchers have paid considerable attention to
the causes of the incumbency advantage in U.S. congressional elections. Scholars have investi-
gated whether incumbents generate such advantage by ideologically aligning themselves to their
constituents (Mayhew, 1974; Serra and Moon, 1994); bringing pork to the district (Mayhew, 1974;
Fiorina, 1980; Feldman and Jondrow, 1984; Stein and Bickers, 1994, 1997; Alvarez and Saving, 1997;
Levitt and Snyder, 1997); focusing on constituency service (Fiorina, 1977; Johannes and McAdams,
1
1981; Fiorina, 1981; Yiannakis, 1981; Johannes, 1984; Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina, 1987; Serra and
Cover, 1992; Serra, 1994; Campbell, 1983; Parker and Parker, 1985); raising high levels of campaign
funds (Glantz, Abramowitz and Burkart, 1976; Jacobson, 1978, 1980; Abramowitz, 1991); scaring
o high-quality challengers (Levitt and Wolfram, 1997; Canon, 1990; Cox and Katz, 1996); and
engaging in activities that might increase their name recognition (Stokes and Miller, 1962; Mayhew,
1974; Abramowitz, 1975; Ferejohn, 1977; Romero, 1996), among others. The few studies in other
developed countries seem to have followed the lead of the U.S. literature and examine the same type
of activities incumbents may engage in to accrue such an advantage.1 After decades of research
on U.S. and non-U.S. elections, however, we have yet to fully understand where the incumbents'
electoral advantage comes from.
To further complicate matters, Ansolabehere and Snyder (2002) examined six decades of data
on congressional, senatorial, and statewide elections and found similar countrywide trends in in-
cumbency advantage, suggesting that such phenomenon is neither unique to Congress nor unique
to legislatures per se. To better disentangle the eects of the factors that might be clustered in the
U.S., I decided to study the same phenomenon in other countries.
In this dissertation, I nd that both electoral institutions and the parties behind the incumbents
appear to have a larger role than the literature has given them credit for, and that in the U.S.
context, between 30 and 40 percent of the incumbents' advantage is driven by them \scaring o"
serious opposition.
In the rst paper of the dissertation, \Voting for Parties or for Candidates: Do Electoral Insti-
tutions Make a Dierence?" I analyze the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) data
to put the U.S. case in a comparative context and explore the impact of electoral institutions on
voting behavior. In particular, I analyze the elections in countries with mixed electoral systems,
where two electoral systems coexist, and thus, where we can clearly observe the eect of electoral
institutions on the vote choices of the electorate since everything else remains constant.
1For example, analyzing British parliamentary elections, Gaines (1998) nds that the recent focus of MPs on
constituency service has not resulted in a higher level of incumbency advantage. Migueis (2010) nds that the
nancial transfers from the Portuguese central government to its municipalities are not the main driver of incumbency
advantage in their municipal elections. Hirano (2007) examines oce-holding benets and candidate quality as
explanations for the success of LDP candidates in Japanese lower house elections. Heintzman (1991) nds that the
advantage of the incumbents in the 1988 Canadian elections cannot be explained by their higher levels of campaign
funds.
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Analyzing the elections in the late nineties in Germany, Hungary, New Zealand, and Japan, I
nd that, as compared to multi-member district PR elections with closed party lists, single-member
district FPTP elections (a) increase the probability to vote for a party other than one's own in
all countries other than in Germany (which politics are known for being heavily party-oriented),
(b) increase the probability of casting a strategic vote in all countries other than in Hungary
(which was a relatively new democracy at the time), and (c) increase the probability of casting a
candidate-centered vote in countries that do not link the two electoral tiers together in a system
of compensatory seats (i.e, Hungary and Japan), but decrease it in countries where they do linked
their tiers and, as a result, the distribution of the lower house seats is almost fully determined by
the PR vote (i.e. Germany and New Zealand). In some countries, the eects are found to vary
depending on (i) the strength of the party attachment, (ii) whether the respondents identied with
a minor party in the SMD tier, (iii) whether the respondent identied with one of the minor parties
of the PR tier, (iv) the margin of victory in the SMD tier, (v) respondent's ability to recall the
names of the SMD candidates, and (vi) respondent's contact with a member of parliament in the
last year. Consistent with recent studies, respondents' knowledge of politics is not found to modify
the eect that electoral institutions have on voting behavior. As a result, we can agree with Carey
and Shugart (1995) and conclude that electoral institutions have a substantial eect on the degree
to which politics in the system is party-oriented or personalistic, and thus, they might in turn have
an impact on the level of incumbency advantage in the elections. More research is needed, however,
to know exactly how and by how much.
In the second paper, \How Parties Help Their Incumbents Win: Evidence from Spain," I identify
an under-explored advantage that comes from holding oce: having the opportunity to prove loyalty
to party leaders and, as a result, gain their support in future elections. In particular, I study
elections to the Spanish Senate, where the commonly studied sources of incumbency advantage
are unlikely to be present and where we can use a precise measure of incumbency advantage. I
gather data on every election to the Spanish Senate from 1977 to 2008 and exploit the multimember
district system to estimate senators' advantage over their co-partisan, non-incumbent challengers.
I nd a small but signicant incumbency advantage, estimated to increase the probability of all
incumbents being reelected by almost 25 percentage points but that of vulnerable incumbents by
more than 50 percentage points. I also nd that the main source of such advantage comes from
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the behavior of the parties, which help their more vulnerable senators get reelected by ensuring
that they be placed rst on the ballot. Since during the elections studied the law stipulated that
candidates be ordered on the ballot alphabetically, in order to ensure that incumbents be placed
rst, parties had to nominate other candidates with last names further down the alphabet.
The ndings of this paper are relevant beyond the elections to the Spanish Senate, which have
relatively low stakes given the limited power of the Spanish upper house of parliament. Although
the specics might vary by electoral system, one can only imagine how much more prominent
this type of strategic behavior by the parties may be in higher-stakes elections, especially those
where parties are powerful. In other contexts, parties might help their vulnerable incumbents
get reelected by supplying organizational support, helping with fundraising, coordinating public
endorsements, discouraging talented within-party challengers, providing key promotions, oering
high-prole appointments, etc. In the U.S. context, for example, using a regression-discontinuity
design Lee (2008) found that, on average, candidates from the incumbent party perform better
at the polls than those from other parties, regardless of incumbency status of the candidates
themselves. This suggests that the parties in power, and not just the incumbents, also have a
way of aecting the electoral outcome. More research is needed to understand the impact of party
actions on incumbency advantage in developed democracies other than Spain.
In the third paper, \Challenger Quality and the Incumbency Advantage," my co-authors and I
provide estimates of the incumbency advantage and the eect of previous oce-holding experience
that account for the strategic entry in the race by high-quality challengers. To do so, we use term
limits as an instrument for challenger quality. Politicians who are term-limited cannot exercise one
of their most popular options running for the oce they currently hold and must either run for
a dierent oce or temporarily retire from politics. As a result, many term-limited candidates run
for another oce when they would not otherwise. This yields an exogenous source of variation in
the presence of high-quality challengers, and therefore a plausible instrument. Studying U.S. state
legislatures, we nd strong evidence of strategic behavior by experienced challengers. However, we
also nd that such behavior does not appear to signicantly bias the estimated eect of challenger
experience or the estimated incumbency advantage. Using our improved estimates, we nd that
between 30 and 40 percent of the incumbency advantage in state legislative races is the result of
scaring o experienced challengers.
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2
Voting for Parties or for Candidates:
Do Electoral Institutions Make a Difference?
Elections in the U.S. have long been considered unique, with its candidate-centered politics and high
levels of incumbency advantage. In this paper, I aim to put the U.S. case in a comparative context
and explore the eect that electoral institutions have on the voting behavior of the electorate.
In particular, I study whether electoral systems aect the likelihood of party defection in lower
house elections, a phenomenon dened as voting for a party other than one's own. In addition, to
the extent possible, I try to distinguish whether voters are casting a ballot for a dierent party for
strategic purposes { voting for a party that has higher chances of winning than their preferred one {
or to support a particular candidate due to the candidate's personal attributes, such as incumbency
status.
When looking at the 36 countries included in the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES)
dataset, I nd that the U.S. is not exceptional when it comes to party defection. Close to 18 percent
of the respondents in the U.S. claimed to have voted in 1996 for a congressman from a dierent
party than the one they identied as their own, a number that falls midway within the distribution
of the sample of countries analyzed.1 However, this list includes countries with very dierent type
of electoral systems. If we only look at elections in which voters cast votes for candidates instead
of parties, the U.S. ranks close to the bottom.
Broad analyses of the data appear inconclusive on whether electoral systems have an eect on
the level of party defection. On average, a vote casted in single-member district elections has a 25
1For details, see Table A.1. in the Appendix.
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percent probability of being for a party other than the respondent's own. Multiple-member district
elections have a probability of party defection twelve percentage points smaller. Proportional
representation elections with open party lists have a probability of party defection four percentage
points higher than that of single-member district elections, on average. Meanwhile, proportional
representation elections with closed party lists have a probability of party defection four percentage
points lower than that of single member district elections, on average. With clustered standard
errors at the country and individual level, however, the only statistically signicant dierences are
those involving multi-member district elections.2
This type of comparison is not very informative since there are many dierences among these
countries other than their electoral systems. The observed dierences in party defection might be
due to dierences in the institutionalization of the parties, for example. Some countries, however,
have mixed electoral systems, that is two electoral systems working alongside each other. In these
cases, we can observe how the dierent electoral systems have an eect on voting behavior, while
controlling for everything else (e.g., country characteristics, individual preferences, etc.).
When focusing on elections in the late nineties in Germany, Hungary, New Zealand, and Japan
{ the four countries in the CSES dataset where two electoral systems coexist { I nd that, as
compared to multi-member district PR elections, single-member district FPTP elections (a) increase
the probability to vote for a party other than one's own in all countries other than in Germany
(which politics are known for being heavily party-oriented), (b) increase the probability of casting a
strategic vote in all countries other than in Hungary (which was a relatively new democracy at the
time), and (c) increase the probability of casting a candidate-centered vote in countries that do not
link the two electoral tiers together in a system of compensatory seats (i.e., Hungary and Japan),
but decrease it in countries where they do linked their tiers and, as a result, the distribution of the
lower house seats is almost fully determined by the PR vote (i.e., Germany and New Zealand).3
In some countries, the eects are found to vary in the expected direction depending on (i) the
strength of the party attachment, (ii) whether the respondents identied with a minor party in
2I used the wild cluster bootstrap t-procedure to estimate the two-way clustered standard errors, which are
more suitable for analyses with small number of clusters Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2008) (STATA command
cgmwildboot, written by Judson Caskey).
3Given data limitations, I am probably underestimating the amount of candidate-centered voting existent in the
elections, therefore, caution should be used in drawing strong conclusions from this part of the analysis.
6
the SMD tier, (iii) whether the respondent identied with one of the minor parties of the PR
tier, (iv) the margin of victory in the SMD tier, (v) respondent's ability to recall the names of
the SMD candidates, and (vi) respondent's contact with a member of parliament in the last year.
Consistent with recent studies, respondents' knowledge of politics is not found to modify the eect
that electoral institutions have on voting behavior.
2.1 Literature Review
In legislative elections that, in turn, determine the head of government, there are three main reasons
for which voters might choose to cast a vote for a party other than their preferred one. First, they
might want to inuence the policy outcome of the election and make their vote \count" by, for
example, voting for a party that has higher chances to win than their own. This is what the
literature calls strategic voting (Cain, 1978; Franklin, Niemi and Whitten, 1994; Fieldhouse, Pattie
and Johnston, 1996; Cox, 1997; Alvarez and Nagler, 2000; Blais, Nadeau, Gidengil and Nevitte,
2001; Aldrich, Blais and Indridason, 2005; Alvarez, Boehmke and Nagler, 2006; Blais and Gschwend,
2010).4 Second, they might want to place a vote for a particular candidate based on the candidate's
personal attributes and such a candidate happens to be aliated with another party. This is what
scholars have identied as the personal vote and incumbency advantage is part of it (Cain, Ferejohn
and Fiorina, 1987; Blais, Gidengil, Dobrzynska, Nevitte and Nadeau, 2003; Marsh, 2007; Marsh,
Sinnott, Garry and Kennedy, 2008). Third, they might want to express their preference for a
specic party leader as head of government based on the personal characteristics of the leader
and despite the leader's aliation with a dierent party than their own (Bean and Mughan, 1989;
Macdonald, Rabinowitz and Listhaug, 1995; Aardal and Oscarsson, 2000; Bartle and Crewe, 2002;
Rosema, 2004; Poguntke and Webb, 2007; Aarts, Blais and Schmitt, 2013).5 Arguably, this is also
a kind of personal vote.
There are many factors that might aect the level of strategic and candidate-centered voting
that takes place in an election. Some of them relate to the attributes of the voters themselves
while others have to do with the characteristics of the electoral system. When it comes to voters'
4Also known as tactical, sophisticated, or insincere voting.
5This phenomenon is also known as the leadership eects and the `presidentialization' or personalization of par-
liamentary politics.
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qualities, for example, scholars have found that weak partisans and supporters of minor parties
are more likely to vote strategically (Karp, Vowles, Banducci and Donovan, 2002; Gschwend, 2007;
Blais and Gschwend, 2010), while their level of political knowledge does not appear to have a clear
eect (Duch and Palmer, 2002; Karp et al., 2002; Gschwend, 2007; Blais and Gschwend, 2010).
Similarly, weak partisans, voters who can recall the candidates' names, who have had contact with
their legislator, or who are politically well-informed have been found to be more likely to cast a
personal vote (Wattenberg, 1998; Dalton, 2000). The main concern of this paper, however, is with
the institutional factors.
The literature on strategic voting behavior initially focused on its incidence in single-member dis-
trict elections (Ludwin, 1978; Homan, 1982; Dummett, 1984; Palfrey, 1984; Gutowski and Georges,
1993; Cox, 1994, 1997). Some scholars found, for example, that voters' likelihood to cast a strate-
gic vote in single-member district FPTP elections increases as the race becomes more competitive
(Bawn, 1999; Reed, 1999; Moser and Scheiner, 2005). Up until recently, the conventional wisdom
was that strategic voting only made sense in single-member rst-past-the-post systems. The logic
laid-out by Duverger (1959) was that in winner-take-all contexts, voters would avoid \wasting"
their vote on contenders that were not likely to win and would choose to vote for a less-preferred,
but more competitive option. In multi-member proportional representation systems, however, as
votes translate into seats more directly, voters would not have any incentives to vote insincerely.
Additionally, as PR systems tend to have more parties, voters might have an easier time nding
a party that is both competitive and of their liking, thus, limiting the odds for strategic voting.
This logic was so accepted by the literature that some scholars used the PR vote as a proxy for the
sincere preferences of voters (Bawn, 1999; Reed, 1999; Moser and Scheiner, 2005).
More recently, however, scholars have found evidence of strategic voting in PR systems, especially
in those that award a small number of seats to each district. Indeed, they found a negative
relationship between the magnitude of the districts and the level of strategic voting observed in
the elections (Leys, 1959; Sartori, 1968; Cox and Shugart, 1996; Cox, 1997; Gschwend, 2009). The
smaller the number of seats in the district, the harder it becomes to allocate them proportionally,
and, thus, the incentives for strategic voting increase. Furthermore, scholars have found that in
PR systems voters might cast a dierent type of strategic vote, one that is aimed at inuencing
the composition of the coalition government (Cox and Shugart, 1996; Cox, 1997; Blais et al., 2001;
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Gschwend, 2004; Aldrich, Blais and Indridason, 2005; Kedar, 2005; Bargsted and Kedar, 2007; Blais
and Gschwend, 2010). For example, voters who support a party expected to win might choose to
cast their ballot for their preferred coalition party, especially if this party might be in danger of
falling under a minimum vote threshold.6 In fact, in a comparative study of elections in Britain,
Israel, Mexico, the Netherlands, and the United States, Abramson, Aldrich, Blais, Diamond, Diskin,
Indridason, Lee and Levine (2010) found similar magnitudes of strategic voting in single-member
rst-past-the-post elections as in in multi-member PR elections. Given the large number of small
parties under PR, they found a greater number of voters supporting minor parties than in FPTP
elections, and, thus, a larger set of voters who had incentives to defect from their preferred party.
In another comparative study, Blais and Gschwend (2010) found that neither the electoral system
nor the number of parties had a direct eect in the amount of strategic voting observed in the lower
house elections of 24 countries.
While there is an extensive literature on the eect of electoral institutions on the level of strategic
voting, much less attention has been given to how, if at all, electoral systems might aect the level
of candidate-centered voting in an election, and by candidate-centered voting I refer to votes cast
to express support for particular district candidates or party leaders.
In regards to candidate-centered voting in support of particular candidates, Carey and Shugart
(1995) ranked electoral systems based on how much personal-vote seeking behavior their institu-
tional arrangements theoretically encourage from the candidates in the race. According to them,
multi-member PR systems with closed party lists are the electoral institutions where personal repu-
tation is least important, and, therefore, where we should expect the least amount of personal-vote
seeking behavior. This, they argue, is especially true as the number of seats allocated to each dis-
trict increases. With the order of the candidates on the ballot xed, candidates have no incentive
to distinguish themselves from their co-partisans, particularly if the number of co-partisans is large.
Also, party control over nominations and ballot ordering ensures a high level of party discipline
and cohesiveness among candidates. In this type of elections, the institutional arrangements en-
courage candidates to cultivate a party reputation, instead of a personal one. In single-member
6Scholars have suggested another type of strategic voting in PR elections. Voters might vote for a dierent party
than their own to inuence which party will form the ocial opposition. There is little evidence that this type of
strategic voting is substantial, however (Blais et al., 2001).
9
rst-past-the-post systems, however, as voters choose candidates directly, candidates might benet
from having a personal reputation. Candidates might, therefore, try to dierentiate themselves
from their party and develop a personal following.7 As a result, then, if candidates' personal-vote
seeking behavior translates into higher levels of candidate-centered voting in the election, based
on their arguments, we should expect higher levels of candidate-centered voting in single-member
FPTP elections than in multi-member PR elections. To my knowledge, however, there has been
no empirical testing of this hypothesis to date.
In regards to candidate-centered voting in support of particular party leaders, most of the litera-
ture has focused on studying the phenomenon in multi-member PR systems. There have been very
few studies that have even acknowledged its potential existence in single-member FPTP elections.8
The implication seems to be that it is a type of party defection more prevalent in PR elections,
where voters are casting votes for parties and therefore where party leader considerations might be
more salient. It is worth noting, however, that this type of party defection will only make sense in
elections that have an eect on the overall number of seats allotted to each party, and, thus, that
have an eect on the determination of the head of government. For example, in mixed electoral
systems with linked tiers, where the seats won by a party in the single-member FPTP election tier
are subtracted from the seats won by that same party in the multi-member PR election tier, then,
voters should not take into consideration their preference of party leader when casting their vote
in the single-member FPTP election.
To summarize, based on the literature, the expectations are to nd a larger incidence of candidate-
centered voting in support of district candidates in single-member FPTP systems, but a larger
proportion of candidate-centered voting in support of party leaders in multi-member PR systems.
When it comes to strategic voting, however, scholars have yet to come to an agreement. Table
2.1 summarizes the expected eects of both electoral institutions and voter characteristics on the
dierent types of party defection.
7Katz (1986) and Marsh (1985) made similar arguments.
8Blais and Gschwend (2010) recognize that this is a type of party defection that may be found in all types of
electoral systems but, since their focus is on strategic voting, they eliminate it from their data.
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Table 2.1: Expected Eects of Electoral Institutions and Voter Characteristics on the Dierent
Types of Party Defection
Multi-Member Single-Member
Type of Party Defection PR Systems FPTP Systemsa
Strategic (Party) Voting Expectation is not clear
electoral characteristics:
- district magnitude (-) Eect NAb
- margin of victory NA (-) Eect
voters' characteristics:
- strength of party attachment (-) Eect
- major party supporter (-) Eect
- political knowledge No or Small Eect
Candidate-Centered Voting
(A) Supporting District Candidate Expectation is <
electoral characteristics:
- district magnitude (-) Eect NAb
voters' characteristics:
- strength of party attachment (-) Eect
- recalls candidates' names (+) Eect
- contact with MP (+) Eect
- political knowledge No or Small Eect
(B) Supporting Party Leader Expectation is >
Notes: a with more than two contenders, b district magnitude in single-member districts is always one
2.2 Data and Methodology
The CSES provides information on the attitudes and voting behavior of a representative sample of
thousands of citizens in 36 countries immediately following one of their lower house elections.9 To
explore how electoral institutions systematically aect voting behavior, I focus on the four countries
in the CSES dataset in which two dierent electoral systems coexist: Germany in 1998, Japan in
1996, Hungary in 1998, and New Zealand in 1996.
In these countries, voters were asked to cast two ballots for the election of the members of the
lower house of their legislature, each vote was under a dierent type of electoral system. They were
asked to vote for a closed party list as part of a proportional representation election, and they were
9I use the August 2003 version of Module 1.
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asked to vote for a candidate either to be chosen by a plurality (in the case of Germany, Japan, and
New Zealand) or by the majority (in the case of Hungary). This type of mixed electoral systems
allow us, then, to observe the eect of electoral institutions on the likelihood to vote for a dierent
party than one's own, while everything else remains constant.
There are a couple of features of the electoral systems used in these four countries that are
important to keep in mind for our purpose. First, in all of them the head of government is inuenced
by the outcome of the lower house elections.10 However, some of the mixed electoral systems have
their two tiers linked together in a system of compensatory seats. In both Germany and New
Zealand, seats won in the single-member district tier are subtracted from the total number of seats
won in the PR tier (Moser and Scheiner, 2004). Since in these countries, the distribution of the
lower house seats is almost fully determined by the PR vote, so is the choice of head of government.
As a consequence, we should assume that there are no party leader eects in the single-member
district FPTP elections. Japan does not use a system of compensation, and, although Hungary
does, its single-member district tier is not directly linked to its PR tier (Moser and Scheiner, 2004).
In these two cases, then, we should allow for party leader eects in the single-member district FPTP
elections. Second, some PR systems impose a minimum legal threshold to attain representation.
Germany, Hungary, and New Zealand impose a legal threshold of ve percent, while Japan does
not impose any threshold. As a result, in the PR tier of Germany, Hungary, and New Zealand we
might observe some strategic voting aimed at helping minor parties cross the threshold (especially
from major party supporters whose party is already expected to win).
The main dependent variables of interest are the amount of party defection observed in each
election, and, to the extent that we can gauge it, the amount of strategic (party) voting and of
candidate-centered voting that compose it. The measure of party defection is created by comparing
the parties respondents claimed to have voted for in each election to their party identication.11
10In Germany, the chancellor is determined based on the partisan composition of the Bundestag. In Hungary, the
leader of the party with the majority of the votes in the National Assembly gets appointed Prime Minister. In Japan,
the Prime Minister is designated by the National Diet from among its members and must enjoy the condence of the
House of Representatives. In New Zealand, the Prime Minister is chosen from amongst the members of the House of
Representatives.
11To create the party identication measure, I used the respondents' answers to the following questions: \Do you
usually think of yourself as close to any particular political party?" \Which one is that?" If more than one was
mentioned: \Which party do you feel closest to?" If none were mentioned: \Do you feel yourself a little closer to one
12
The measure of strategic voting is, in turn, formed by two components: (a) strategic voting for
major parties and (b) strategic voting for the threshold party. Strategic voting for major parties
captures the number of respondents who voted for competitive parties in the election instead of
voting for their own minor party, which had lower chances of winning.12;13 In the case of multi-
member district elections, I consider votes for the major two parties from supporters of any less
popular parties to be a strategic vote. In addition, I also consider votes for any party that ended
up with at least on seat in parliament from supporters of parties that did not also to be a strategic
vote.14 In the case of single-member district elections, the major parties are considered to be the
top two but the vote is only considered to be strategic if the margin of victory of the winner was
ten percentage points or less. The assumption is that in non-competitive races, voters knew ahead
of time that their vote was not going to make a dierence either way, thus, the incentive to vote
insincerely vanishes.15 Strategic voting for the threshold party captures the number of respondents
who decided to vote for a party less popular than their own to help a borderline party achieve the
minimum ve percent of votes required for representation. For this purpose, a borderline party is
dened as a party that achieved between three and seven percent of the vote the elections.16
The measure of candidate-centered voting is also formed by two components: (a) candidate-center
voting for a party leader and (b) candidate-center voting for a candidate. The rst measures the
amount of party defection that can be explained by the party leader preferences of the respondents.
In other words, it measures the number of votes that respondents casted for the party of their
of the political parties than the others?" \If so, which one?" (In New Zealand this last question was not asked, and,
thus, it was not used in the construction of the PID variable).
12This is a common measure of strategic voting. For example, Niou (2001) and Abramson et al. (2010) measure
strategic voting as vote deviations from minor parties to competitive parties.
13As is convention in the literature, the ranking of the parties is based on the electoral outcomes (i.e., it assumes
that respondents' expectations about the viability of the parties before the elections were right).
14Gschwend (2009) uses a similar measurement.
15Similarly, I assume no strategic voting in single-member districts with only two contenders (of which there are
only a few cases in Japan).
16As Japanese elections do not impose a legal threshold, I assume that Japan does not have this type of strategic
voting.
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preferred party leader (or leaders, when they had more than one) instead of their own party.17;18
The second should capture the amount of party defection that takes place in an election for the sake
of expressing the preference of a particular candidate in the race due to the candidate's personal
qualities. Unfortunately, we lack any good direct measure of this type of party defection for most
countries and elections.19;20 Instead, I create a variable indicating the amount of party defection
that is not consistent with any of the other explanations, with the understanding that the remainder
might indeed be caused by candidate-level considerations. It is worth noting, however, that the
explanations are not mutually exclusive and they might observationally result in the same outcome,
making it very dicult for us to accurately distinguish among them. A voter, for example, might
choose to vote for one of the major parties because of the liking of a particular candidate, yet,
given the methodology used here, we would be considering this vote a strategic one instead of a
candidate-centered one, and thus it would not be part of the unexplained remainder. In other words,
the measure of candidate-centered voting for a particular candidate is probably an under-estimate.
The main independent variables of interest are the two dierent electoral systems used in these
countries: single-member district FPTP elections and multi-member PR elections with closed party
lists. Because we are comparing the two votes cast by the same individual, in the same country,
at the same time, we can simply compare the average outcomes to see the eect of the electoral
institutions on their voting behavior. However, in order to see whether the dierences are statis-
tically signicant and also explore whether they are exacerbated by other factors, I perform an
analysis where I interact the electoral system with other potential determinants of party defection:
(1) respondent's strength of party attachment gauged by whether the respondent admitted to feel-
ing close to a party when rst asked, (2) whether the respondent identied with a minor party in
17To identify the respondents' preferred party leader(s), I used their ratings on a scale from zero (strongly dislike)
to 10 (strongly like) of the major party leaders in the election. First, the leaders were the highest rankings were
identied. Then, a vote for their party was considered to be a vote for them if their ranking was seven or above.
18Blais and Gschwend (2010) use a similar methodology to identify this type of party defection.
19The exceptions are the single-member district elections in Hungary and Japan, where respondents were asked to
name the candidates in the election and, therefore, where we can observe whether their vote choice coincides with
the party of the candidates they recall.
20This module of the CSES dataset does not even contain information on who the incumbents are.
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either the PR tier or the FPTP tier,21 (3) the respondent's level of political knowledge,22 (4) the
level of competition of the SMD race measured by the electoral margin between the rst two major
parties,23 (5) a measure of the respondent's recollection of the names of the candidates from the last
lower house election, and (6) whether the respondent had contact with a member of the legislature
in the last year. Given that the last two could be endogenous to the electoral system and therefore
introduce post-treatment bias to the regressions, they are included separately. Unfortunately, this
module of the CSES dataset does not contain information on the number of seats assigned to each
district in the PR elections (i.e., district magnitude). It only reports country averages.24 The most
complete of the models used for the analysis is, thus, as follows:
Party Defectionics or (2.1)
Strategic (Party) Voteics or
Candidate-Centered Voteics = 1 PR Electionics
+ 2 Feels Close to a Party ic  PR Electionics
+ 3 Identies with Minor Party in SMD ic  PR Electionics
+ 4 Identies with Minor Party in PRic  PR Electionics
+ 5 Political Knowledgeic  PR Electionics
+ 6 Margin in SMD Tier ic  PR Electionics
+ 7 Name Recollectionic  PR Electionics
+ 8 Contact with MP ic  PR Electionics
+ ic + ic + ics
where:
 Party Defectionics indicates whether respondent i in country c voted for a party other than his
or her own in the elections using electoral system s, where s is either single-member district
FPTP or multi-member district PR with closed party lists.
 Strategic (Party) Voteics indicates whether respondent i in country c casted a strategic vote
in the elections using electoral system s.
21In this context, I dene minor parties as the parties that did not received the largest two vote shares in the SMD
tier and as all parties that did not get at least one seat in parliament in the PR tier.
22In most countries, respondents were asked three questions to asses their political knowledge. (Only two were
asked in Japan). Unfortunately, the level of diculty of these questions varies widely across countries, which is why
for the analysis the variable is standardized to be centered in zero and with standard deviation one in each country.
23There is only data on the level of competition of the PR race at the national level. Because the model includes
respondents' xed eects, country level variables will be dropped out of the analysis.
24It also reports the district magnitude of the single-member district tier of mixed-electoral systems (which is
always one) and of the elections that are not part of a mixed-electoral system, which is what Gschwend (2009) used
for his study, but cannot help us in ours.
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 Candidate-Centered Voteics indicates whether respondent i in country c casted a candidate-
centered vote in the elections using electoral system s.
 PR Electionics indicates whether the vote cast by individual i in country c is in the multi-
member PR election system (s).
 Feels Close to a Party ic indicates whether respondent i in country c reported to feel close to
a party.25
 Identies with Minor Party in SMD ic indicates whether respondent i in country c identied
with one of the minor parties in the SMD tier.
 Identies with Minor Party in PRic indicates whether respondent i in country c identied
with one of the minor parties.
 Political Knowledgeic is a measure, demanded and standardized at the country level, identi-
fying the level of political knowledge of respondent i in country c.
 Margin in SMD Tier ic is a measure, demeaned and standardized at the country level, of the
margin of victory in the SMD election in the district of respondent i in country c.
 Name Recollectionic is a measure, demanded and standardized at the country level, indicating
the number of SMD candidates that respondent i in country c was able to recall correctly.
 Contact with MP ic indicates whether respondent i in country c had had any contact with a
member of parliament during the past twelve months.
 ic and ic are respectively xed and random eects for each respondent i in each country c.
 ics are the usual residuals.
By including respondent's xed eects, the model estimates how the voting behavior of the same
individual changes, on average, as a result of simply voting in a dierent electoral system.26 Notice
that because we want the main coecient of interest { that of the variable PR Electionics alone {
to capture the average dierence in voting behavior between the two systems, all other variables
in the regression are constructed so as to take values of zero for the \average" respondent in each
country.27;28 As a result, a positive coecient of this variable should be indicative of a larger amount
25In all countries other than New Zealand, the average respondent did not feel close to a party. Because we want
the baseline category to reect the characteristics of the average respondent in each country, for the analysis of New
Zealand elections, we included instead a variable indicating whether the respondent did not feel close to a party.
26To account for the lack of independence between the two votes from the same individual, standard errors are
clustered at the respondents' level.
27In practice, this meant to demean and standardize all continuous variables so that they would have mean zero
and standard deviation at the country level. Similarly, dummy variables were designed so as to indicate when a
respondent had a characteristic that deviated from the majority in the country, so that when they took values of
zero, they would t the description of the median respondent in the country.
28The baseline category is, then, the expected likelihood of casting a vote for a dierent party or a strategic vote
or a candidate-centered vote (depending on the outcome variable) in the single-member district FPTP election of
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of party defection in the PR tier than in the SMD tier for the average respondent in the country.
Conversely, a negative coecient should be indicative of a larger amount of party defection in the
SMD tier than in the PR tier for the average respondent in the country.
By adding the interaction terms, we can gauge whether the eect of the electoral systems on
voting behavior is dierent based on other characteristic of the system or of the voters. Positive
coecients of the interactions would indicate that respondents are more likely to vote for a party
other than their own (or cast a strategic vote or a candidate vote, depending on the outcome
variable) in the PR system than in the SMD district when the value of the variable interacted takes
on positive values than when the value of the variable interacted is equal to zero.29 Because the
respondent's ability to recall the candidates' name or their contact with a member of parliament
could be the result of the candidates' personal-vote seeking behavior and therefore endogenous to
the electoral system, I include those separately to the regressions. As a result, for each combination
of country and dependent variable, I run three models: one without any interactions, one with the
rst set of interactions, and the complete (2.1) model.
2.3 Results
Table 2.2 displays the percentage of party defection found in each type of election by country as well
as the percentage of party defection consistent with the dierent explanations described above. As
shown in the table, in all countries other than in Germany, there are higher levels of party defection
in the FPTP system than in the PR system. In Germany, the amount of party defection appears
to be quite similar in both types of elections.
In terms of the dierent potential explanations for party defection, in almost all cases we nd that
the FPTP system appears to encourage both a larger amount of strategic voting and a larger amount
of candidate-centered voting than the PR system. This is true even after we include the votes for a
threshold party in the strategic voting measure in the PR systems of Germany, Hungary and New
a respondent who does not feel close to any party (in all except in New Zealand), who identies with one of the
major two parties in the SMD tier, who also identies with one of the major parties in the PR tier, whose political
knowledge is average, whose corresponding SMD race was averagely competitive, whose ability to recall the names
of the SMD candidates was average, and who did not have contact with any member of parliament in the last year.
29To help with the interpretation of coecients, continuous variables are standardized to be centered at zero and
with standard deviation one in each country. See Table A.1. in the Appendix for a summary statistics of the variables
in each country.
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Zealand.30 The two exceptions are Germany and New Zealand, where we nd larger amounts of
candidate-centered voting in the PR system than in the FPTP system. Perhaps not coincidentally,
these are the two countries that have tiers linked together in a system of compensatory seats, and
therefore where voters do not have the incentive to cast a vote for their preferred party leader in
their SMD election since such vote would have no eect on the choice of the head of government
(Moser and Scheiner, 2005).
Table 2.2: Party Defection, Strategic Voting, and Candidate-Centered Voting by Electoral System
and Country
Total Strategic Vote Candidate Vote
Percent % Vote for % Vote for % Vote for Unexplained :
Party Major Threshold Party % Vote for
Defection Parties Partya Leaderb Candidate?
PR FPTP PR FPTP PR FPTP PR FPTP PR FPTP
Germany 0.175 0.170 0.046 0.090 0.006 0.000 0.113 0.000 0.031 0.081
(n=2,019) (0.380) (0.376) (0.211) (0.286) (0.079) (0.000) (0.317) (0.000) (0.174) (0.272)
Hungary 0.075 0.172 0.035 0.053 0.007 0.000 0.040 0.122 0.017 0.036
(n=1,525) (0.264) (0.378) (0.183) (0.225) (0.083) (0.000) (0.197) (0.327) (0.128) (0.187)
Japan 0.203 0.277 0.033 0.117 0.000 0.000 0.106 0.150 0.077 0.082
(n=1,327) (0.403) (0.448) (0.178) (0.321) (0.000) (0.000) (0.309) (0.357) (0.266) (0.274)
New Zealand 0.213 0.299 0.042 0.127 0.009 0.000 0.155 0.000 0.039 0.172
(n=4,080) (0.410) (0.458) (0.202) (0.333) (0.094) (0.000) (0.362) (0.000) (0.193) (0.377)
Average 0.181 0.245 0.041 0.105 0.007 0.000 0.121 0.039 0.039 0.116
(0.385) (0.430) (0.198) (0.307) (0.082) (0.000) (0.326) (0.193) (0.193) (0.321)
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. Elections in Germany and Hungary were held in 1998. Those in
Japan and New Zealand in 1996. a The minimum legal threshold to attain representation was imposed only in
the PR tiers of Germany, Hungary and New Zealand. b Given the linked tiers in Germany and New Zealand, we
assume no party leader eects in their single-member district elections.
It is worth mentioning again that, given the identication strategy, it is likely that I am under-
estimating the amount of candidate-centered voting that goes on in the elections. As explained
earlier, a vote cast for the incumbent in the race, if in a competitive race, would be counted as a
strategic vote for the major parties instead of a candidate vote. Also, for example, in Japan, almost
26 percent of respondents voted for one of the candidates whose name they were able to recall in
30Recall that this type of strategic vote is non-existent in the FPTP systems or in the PR system of Japan which
does not impose a minimum legal threshold for representation.
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the SMD election instead of for the candidate of their preferred party. Such voting behavior would
indeed be consistent with a personal vote. However, given the measurement used, I have estimated
the amount of voting for specic candidates in the Japanese SMD elections at little more than eight
percent.31
It is also interesting to note here the dierences between the countries. Both Japan and New
Zealand have signicantly higher amounts of party defection than Germany and Hungary. In the
FPTP election in New Zealand, for example, we nd that almost 30 percent of respondents claimed
to have voted for a party other than their own. In contrast, in the PR elections in Hungary, only
seven and a half percent of respondents were party defectors. The largest dierences seem to be
driven by variations in the amount of candidate-centered behavior. This is not all that surprising
since Japanese politics are highly personalistic, New Zealand party ties with the electorate were
weakening at the time of the 1996 elections, German politics are known for being heavily party-
oriented, and Hungary was a relatively new democracy at the time (Moser and Scheiner, 2005; Karp
et al., 2002; Denemark, 2001; Conradt and Langenbacher, 2001). Perhaps some of these dierences
will be better explained once we take into consideration other characteristics of the systems and
the voters.
Tables 2.3 through 2.6 show the results of the analyses performed in each of the four countries.
Columns (1) through (3) use as the dependent variable whether the respondent voted for a party
other than his or her own. Columns (4) through (6) use as the dependent variable whether the
respondent was identied as casting a strategic (party) vote. Finally, columns (7) through (9) use as
the dependent variable whether the respondent was identied as casting a candidate-centered vote
(whether for a specic party leader or for a particular candidate in the race). For each dependent
variable, three regressions were run. The rst model did not include any interactions to gauge
whether the observed dierences between the systems were statistically signicant. The second
model included the rst set of interactions, which should not introduce post-treatment bias to the
regression and might help us explain some of the variation observed. The third model used all
31Unfortunately, the only other country for which we have enough information to come up with this statistic is
Hungary. In Hungarian SMD elections, about nine and a half percent of respondents voted for one of the candidates
whose name they were able to recall instead of for their own party. The current measurement estimates the amount
of voting for specic candidates at less than four percent.
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interaction terms, including those that might be endogenous to the electoral systems, and therefore
we should be cautious when drawing conclusions from them.
Table 2.3: Eects of the Electoral Institutions in the 1998 German Elections
Dependent Variable
Party Defection Strategic Vote Candidate Vote
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
PR Election 0.007 0.100 0.101 -0.038 0.010 0.013 0.066 0.106 0.104
(0.020) (0.036) (0.036) (0.013) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.036) (0.036)
PR  Feels -0.043 -0.041 0.006 0.009 -0.062 -0.061
Close to a Party (0.042) (0.043) (0.025) (0.026) (0.039) (0.040)
PR  Identies with -0.160 -0.160 -0.144 -0.145 0.005 0.005
Minor Party in SMD (0.045) (0.045) (0.031) (0.031) (0.038) (0.038)
PR  Identies with 0.034 0.028 0.404 0.403 -0.157 -0.160
Minor Party in PR (0.155) (0.157) (0.173) (0.172) (0.178) (0.181)
PR  Political -0.032 -0.029 -0.017 -0.015 -0.018 -0.016
Knowledge (0.021) (0.021) (0.014) (0.014) (0.019) (0.018)
PR  Margin in 0.022 0.018 0.016 0.015 -0.000 -0.003
SMD Tier (0.021) (0.021) (0.013) (0.014) (0.017) (0.018)
PR  Name -0.028 -0.003 -0.021
Recollection (0.020) (0.012) (0.018)
PR  Contact 0.006 -0.031 0.027
with MP (0.058) (0.037) (0.049)
Observations 2,236 2,211 2,205 2,236 2,211 2,205 2,236 2,211 2,205
Notes: Respondent clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. Coecients statistically signicant at the
90 percent level of condence are shown in bold. All regressions include respondent xed eects.
The rst thing to notice when looking over the tables of results is that electoral institutions are
found to have a statistically signicant eect on the likelihood of voting for a party other than
one's own in all countries except in Germany.
In Japan, Hungary and New Zealand, respondents were more likely to vote for a party other
than their own in the SMD election than in the PR election. The eect ranges from almost seven
to nine and a half percentage points, depending on the country. The statistical signicance of the
eect, however, disappears in both Japan and New Zealand once we control for the rst set of
interactions. In these cases, while electoral institutions have an eect on the overall amount of
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Table 2.4: Eects of the Electoral Institutions in the 1996 Japanese Elections
Dependent Variable
Party Defection Strategic Vote Candidate Vote
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
PR Election -0.069 0.094 0.093 -0.089 -0.011 -0.012 -0.040 0.099 0.097
(0.028) (0.058) (0.057) (0.020) (0.033) (0.033) (0.028) (0.061) (0.060)
PR  Feels -0.078 -0.074 -0.004 -0.004 -0.079 -0.077
Close to a Party (0.063) (0.063) (0.042) (0.043) (0.067) (0.067)
PR  Identies with -0.310 -0.314 -0.228 -0.235 -0.225 -0.224
Minor Party in SMD (0.062) (0.062) (0.048) (0.049) (0.067) (0.067)
PR  Identies with 0.259 0.241 1.246 1.256 -0.835 -0.862
Minor Party in PR (0.076) (0.061) (0.050) (0.054) (0.075) (0.068)
PR  Political 0.013 0.014 0.016 0.017 -0.000 0.000
Knowledge (0.024) (0.025) (0.017) (0.018) (0.026) (0.027)
PR  Margin in 0.009 0.007 0.009 0.008 -0.002 -0.004
SMD Tier (0.026) (0.026) (0.015) (0.016) (0.027) (0.026)
PR  Name -0.051 0.006 -0.063
Recollection (0.034) (0.022) (0.035)
PR  Contact 0.081 0.019 0.082
with MP (0.080) (0.040) (0.083)
Observations 1,239 1,239 1,220 1,239 1,239 1,220 1,239 1,239 1,220
Notes: Respondent clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. Coecients statistically signicant at the
90 percent level of condence are shown in bold. All regressions include respondent xed eects.
party defection in the country, it does not seem to aect the likelihood of party defection of the
average respondent in the country. As we will see later, however, they do have an eect on some
of the other type of voters in the country.
In Germany, electoral institutions are found to have no statistically signicant eect on the
overall likelihood of party defection. (As we will see later, this result is driven by the estimated
eect of electoral institutions on the likelihood of candidate-centered voting in Germany.) Electoral
institutions are found, however, to have a statistically signicant eect on the likelihood of defection
for the average respondent in the country. In this case, the average voter is found to have a higher
probability of defecting in the PR election than in the SMD election.
In all countries except in Hungary, respondents are found to be more likely to cast a strategic
vote in the SMD election than in the PR election, overall. The dierences range from almost four
to almost eight percentage points. Their statistical signicance disappears once we control for the
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Table 2.5: Eects of the Electoral Institutions in the 1998 Hungarian Elections
Dependent Variable
Party Defection Strategic Vote Candidate Vote
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
PR Election -0.095 -0.118 -0.113 -0.011 -0.013 -0.014 -0.099 -0.124 -0.117
(0.018) (0.033) (0.031) (0.014) (0.022) (0.022) (0.019) (0.033) (0.032)
PR  Feels 0.059 0.066 0.013 0.012 0.064 0.072
Close to a Party (0.038) (0.039) (0.029) (0.029) (0.040) (0.040)
PR  Identies with -0.027 -0.032 -0.034 -0.034 -0.017 -0.024
Minor Party in SMD (0.041) (0.041) (0.028) (0.029) (0.042) (0.042)
PR  Identies with -0.009 -0.007 0.122 0.121 -0.067 -0.063
Minor Party in PR (0.084) (0.082) (0.088) (0.088) (0.084) (0.083)
PR  Political 0.002 0.016 -0.011 -0.010 0.000 0.013
Knowledge (0.018) (0.018) (0.013) (0.013) (0.019) (0.019)
PR  Margin in -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.007 -0.008
SMD Tier (0.019) (0.019) (0.014) (0.014) (0.020) (0.019)
PR  Name -0.063 -0.007 -0.061
Recollection (0.017) (0.014) (0.018)
PR  Contact 0.048 0.025 0.023
with MP (0.058) (0.036) (0.058)
Observations 1,434 1,432 1,425 1,434 1,432 1,425 1,434 1,432 1,425
Notes: Respondent clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. Coecients statistically signicant at the
90 percent level of condence are shown in bold. All regressions include respondent xed eects.
rst set of interactions, indicating again, that although the eects are signicant overall they are
not signicant for the average respondent in the country. The dierences, then, are explained by
the voting behavior of respondents with qualities that deviate from the norm (more on this later).
In Hungary, the coecients are all of the right sign but not statistically signicant.
Major dierences across countries arise when looking at the eects of electoral institutions on
the probability of casting a candidate-centered vote. While respondents are found to be more likely
to cast a candidate-centered vote in the PR election than in the SMD election in both Germany
and New Zealand, the opposite is estimated to be true in Hungary and Japan. Note, however,
that the eects in New Zealand and Japan are not statistically signicant in the regression without
interactions.32 As mentioned earlier, these dierences across countries might perhaps be explained
32The eects in Germany and Hungary remain statistically signicant even after controlling for the rst set of
interactions, and in New Zealand, the eect becomes statistically signicant once we control for the rst set of
interactions.
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Table 2.6: Eects of the Electoral Institutions in the 1996 New Zealand Elections
Dependent Variable
Party Defection Strategic Vote Candidate Vote
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
PR Election -0.085 0.032 0.043 -0.078 0.001 0.016 0.022 0.040 0.038
(0.017) (0.022) (0.025) (0.010) (0.008) (0.011) (0.016) (0.022) (0.025)
PR  Does NOT Feel 0.061 0.046 -0.034 -0.043 0.077 0.073
Close to a Party (0.076) (0.077) (0.059) (0.058) (0.073) (0.074)
PR  Identies with -0.249 -0.250 -0.176 -0.179 -0.041 -0.040
Minor Party in SMD (0.034) (0.034) (0.021) (0.021) (0.033) (0.033)
PR  Identies with -0.198 -0.187 0.180 0.189 -0.120 -0.117
Minor Party in PR (0.114) (0.115) (0.125) (0.125) (0.139) (0.140)
PR  Political 0.019 0.027 0.013 0.017 0.009 0.011
Knowledge (0.017) (0.018) (0.010) (0.011) (0.017) (0.018)
PR  Margin in 0.061 0.059 0.031 0.031 0.030 0.028
SMD Tier (0.016) (0.016) (0.010) (0.010) (0.016) (0.016)
PR  Name -0.025 -0.007 -0.013
Recollection (0.018) (0.011) (0.019)
PR  Contact -0.031 -0.044 0.007
with MP (0.036) (0.023) (0.034)
Observations 4,281 4,281 4,265 4,281 4,281 4,265 4,281 4,281 4,265
Notes: Respondent clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. Coecients statistically signicant at the
90 percent level of condence are shown in bold. All regressions include respondent xed eects.
by the linkage between the two tiers of the mixed electoral systems of Germany and New Zealand.
As the choice for head of government is determined solely by the outcome of the PR election, the
incentives to cast a personal vote for a particular party leader in the SMD election vanishes. Having
said that, given the limitations of the identication strategy used for this type of party defection, I
refrain from drawing strong conclusions from this part of the analysis. Let us turn now to examine
the interaction eect between the electoral systems and other characteristics of the election or the
voters.
The strength of party attachment only appears to be signicant in Hungarian elections, and only
after controlling for both name recollection and contact with MP. In this case, respondents who felt
close to their party were more likely to cast a candidate-centered vote in the SMD election than in
the PR election as compared to those who did not feel close to their party and holding all other
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variables at the country average. In other words, they were less likely to vote for a party than their
own when casting a vote specically for a party than when casting a vote for a candidate.
As predicted, respondents who identied with one of the minor parties of the SMD tier (i.e.,
those that were not one of the top two contenders) were more likely to vote strategically in the
SMD election than in the PR election in all countries expect in Hungary, where the coecient is of
the right sign but not statistically signicant. In the case of Japan, they were also more likely to
cast a candidate-vote in the SMD election than in the PR election. Also as expected, respondents
who identied with one of the minor parties of the PR tier (i.e., those that did not get even a single
seat) were more likely to vote strategically in the PR election than in the SMD election. Although
all coecients are of the right sign, they are only statistically signicant in Germany and Japan,
however. In Japan, these respondents are also found to be more likely to cast a candidate-vote in
the SMD than in the PR election.
The margin of victory in the SMD tier appears to only have a statistically signicant eect in
the New Zealand elections. Consistent with the literature, I nd that, as the margin of victory
grows, the incentive for strategic voting in the SMD elections decreases. Interestingly, so does the
amount of candidate-centered voting observed in the SMD election, as compared to that in the PR
election.33
As theorized, respondents who were capable of recalling the names of the SMD candidates were
more likely to cast a candidate vote in the SMD election than in the PR election. The coecients
are estimated to be of the right sign in all countries, but are found statistically signicant only in
Hungary and Japan. Having been in contact with a member of parliament in the last twelve months
is found to only have a statistically signicant eect in New Zealand. Those who had been in contact
with a member of parliament were more likely to cast a strategic vote in the SMD election than
in the PR election. Perhaps their contact was with the incumbent candidate in the SMD election
and if the race was competitive and the incumbent was among the top two contenders, then, given
the measurement strategy, we would be counting a vote for the incumbent as a strategic vote (even
though it might indeed be a candidate-centered vote). Lastly, consistent with recent studies, the
33Perhaps uncompetitive SMD races do not attract very charismatic challengers or perhaps, as voters are more
likely to vote sincerely in the SMD tier, they feel more inclined to cast a vote for a party leader in the PR tier.
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level of voters' political knowledge does not seem to have a systematic eect on their propensity to
vote for a party other than their own.
To summarize, single-member district FPTP elections, as compared to multi-member district
PR elections, are found (a) to increase the probability to vote for a party other than one's own in
all countries other than in Germany,34 (b) to increase the probability of casting a strategic vote in
all countries other than in Hungary,35 and (c) to increase the probability of casting a candidate-
centered vote in countries without their tiers linked (i.e., Hungary and Japan), but to decrease it
in countries with linked tiers (i.e., Germany and New Zealand). Eects are found to vary in the
expected direction depending on (i) the strength of the party attachment (in the case of Hungary),
(ii) whether the respondents identied with a minor party in the SMD tier (in all countries other
than in Hungary), (iii) whether the respondent identied with one of the minor parties of the PR
tier (in Germany and Japan), (iv) the margin of victory in the SMD tier (in New Zealand), (v)
respondent's ability to recall the names of the SMD candidates (in Hungary and Japan), and (vi)
respondent's contact with a member of parliament in the last year (in New Zealand). Consistent
with recent studies, respondents' knowledge of politics is not estimated to modify the eect that
electoral institutions have on voting behavior.
2.4 Discussion: The U.S. Case
In the U.S. context, party defection in congressional elections appear to be a good proxy for
incumbency advantage, on the grounds that if citizens are voting for a party other than their own
it usually is because they are voting for the incumbent. A cursory look at the trends of incumbency
advantage and party defection in the U.S., shows how closely these two phenomena follow each
other. See Figures 2.1 and 2.2.
This is true because congressional elections in the U.S. are single-member district FPTP elections
with only two contenders and in which outcomes bear no direct eect on the election of the head of
government (i.e., the U.S. President). As a result, voters have no incentive to either cast a strategic
vote or to cast a vote for their preferred party leader as head of government. When put in this
34Where the eect is not statistically signicant.
35Where the eect is of the right sign but not statistically signicant.
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context, it makes sense that the level of party defection observed in the U.S. election in the CSES
dataset should be relatively small compared to that of other countries.
Figure 2.1: Congressmen's Incumbency Ad-
vantage in the U.S., 1940-1990
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Figure 2.2: Party Defection in US Congres-
sional Elections, 1940-1990
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However, since we have found evidence that the electoral institutional arrangements might en-
courage dierent levels of party defection, partisan voting, and candidate-centered voting, when
comparing the voting behavior in the U.S. system to other countries, one should make sure to do
so with countries with similar electoral systems.
2.5 Conclusion
This paper explores the impact of electoral institutions on the probability that voters will cast a
ballot for a party other than their own, whether it be to make their vote \count" towards achieving
a preferred electoral outcome or to support a specic candidate. Specically, I analyze the voting
behavior in the four countries in the CSES dataset that use a mixed-electoral system, where we
can observe the same individual casting two votes at the same time, each in a dierent electoral
system. This way, we can compare their voting behavior in the two dierent electoral systems,
while keeping everything else constant.
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Analyzing the elections in the late nineties in Germany, Hungary, New Zealand, and Japan, I
nd that, as compared to multi-member district PR elections with closed party lists, single-member
district FPTP elections (a) increase the probability to vote for a party other than one's own in all
countries other than in Germany (which politics are known for being heavily party-oriented), (b)
increase the probability of casting a strategic vote in all countries other than in Hungary (which was
a relatively new democracy at the time), and (c) increase the probability of casting a candidate-
centered vote in countries without their tiers linked (i.e., Hungary and Japan), but decrease it in
countries with linked tiers (i.e., Germany and New Zealand).
In some countries, the eects are found to vary in the expected direction depending on (i) the
strength of the party attachment, (ii) whether the respondents identied with a minor party in
the SMD tier, (iii) whether the respondent identied with one of the minor parties of the PR
tier, (iv) the margin of victory in the SMD tier, (v) respondent's ability to recall the names of
the SMD candidates, and (vi) respondent's contact with a member of parliament in the last year.
Consistent with recent studies, respondents' knowledge of politics is not found to modify the eect
that electoral institutions have on voting behavior.
Based on the evidence presented in this paper, then, we can agree with Carey and Shugart (1995)
and conclude that electoral institutions have a substantial eect on the degree to which politics in
the system is party-oriented or personalistic, and, thus, they might in turn have an impact on the
level of incumbency advantage in the elections. More research is needed, however, to know exactly
how and by how much.
There are some limitations to the analyses presented here. First and foremost, the measure
of candidate-centered voting probably grossly underestimates the amount of personal voting that
might be taking place in the elections. For example, it would currently not identify a personal
vote for the incumbent in the race as a candidate-centered vote, if the incumbent was amongst
the top two contenders in a competitive race. As a result, one should be cautious to draw any
strong conclusions from the part of the analysis that relies on this data. I plan to collect data
on the identity and partisan aliation of the incumbents in the race with the aim to improve
this measure in future versions of the paper. Second, the study relies on respondents claims of
their voting behavior after the election. In this type of electoral survey, scholars have found that
respondents tend to report to have voted for the winner even if they did not (Alvarez and Nagler,
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2000). If this is the case, I might be overestimating the amount of strategic behavior in the elections.
Unfortunately, there is nothing that I can do about it but the hope is that, if there is any lying,
it might be consistent across electoral systems and, therefore, not have much of an impact on the
results.
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How Parties Help Their Incumbents Win: Evidence from Spain
Incumbents are consistently found to have an electoral advantage over their challengers in developed
democracies.1 The normative ramications of this phenomenon depend in part on its sources. If
incumbents fare better than their challengers at the polls simply because they are better candidates,
we would perceive their advantage as a sign of a healthy democracy. If the electoral advantage of
incumbents comes from their exploiting oce resources to deter high-quality challengers, however,
then the incumbents' advantage would diminish the accountability and competitiveness of the
elections and have serious negative consequences for representation.
Many scholars have looked for the potential sources of incumbency advantage, especially in
reference to U.S. elections. Despite the large existing literature, there is very little consensus.
Scholars have focused primarily on the activities in which the incumbents personally engage in
order to accrue such advantage and have mostly neglected the activities in which parties engage
in order to favor their incumbents. The literature on political parties, however, has long identied
parties as organizations that aim to foster the electoral success of their aliates (Aldrich, 1995).
We might, then, reasonably suppose that party actions drive some of the observed incumbency
advantage. In the study presented here, I provide extensive evidence of a meaningful incumbency
advantage created not by the actions of individual politicians but by the actions of their parties.
1For U.S. elections see, for example, Erikson (1971, 1972); Mayhew (1974); Cover and Mayhew (1977); Gelman
and King (1990); Levitt and Wolfram (1997); Ansolabehere, Snyder and Stewart (2000); Ansolabehere and Snyder
(2002); Gelman and Huang (2008). For parliamentary elections in the U.K see, for example, Gaines (1998), and Katz
and King (1999). For German elections see Hainmueller and Kern (2008). For Japanese elections see Reed (1994);
Hirano (2007). For Canadian provincial elections see Krashinsky and Milne (1983). For Canadian federal elections
see Krashinsky and Milne (1985) and Kendall and Rekkas (2012). For municipal elections in Portugal see Migueis
(2010).
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In this paper, I study the elections to the Spanish Senate, where the commonly studied sources
of incumbency advantage are very unlikely to be present. Among other things, Spanish senators
cannot credibly take credit for any particular piece of legislation, they have limited access to
resources that they can use for their electoral advantage, and they do not have control over campaign
funds. Consequently, if we nd that Spanish senators have an advantage over their challengers,
we should look for other sources as potentially responsible. In addition, the design of the electoral
system of the Spanish Senate allows for an unusually precise measurement of incumbency advantage.
Spanish senatorial elections follow a multimember plurality system, where multiple candidates from
the same party run alongside each other when competing for multiple seats in a district. Following
Hirano and Snyder (2009), we can estimate the incumbents' advantage by comparing their electoral
outcomes to those of their co-partisans running in the same race.
Analyzing a newly compiled dataset, I nd that in the nine elections following the re-establishment
of Spanish democracy in 1977, senators enjoyed a signicant advantage over their co-partisan chal-
lengers. This advantage is estimated to increase the probability of all incumbents being reelected by
almost 25 percentage points but that of vulnerable incumbents by more than 50 percentage points.
Furthermore, I nd that the main source of such advantage came from the strategic behavior of the
parties, which helped their more vulnerable senators get reelected by ensuring that they be placed
rst on the ballot. Since during these elections the law stipulated that candidates be ordered on
the ballot alphabetically, to ensure that incumbents be placed rst, parties had to nominate the
incumbents' running mates with last names further down the alphabet. Based on the evidence
presented here, this practice became widespread after 1986, especially among parties that did not
have sucient support in the district to get all of their candidates elected.
The ndings of this paper are relevant beyond the elections to the Spanish Senate. The evidence
identies parties' actions as a signicant source of the incumbents' advantage in Spanish senatorial
elections, in which parties have relatively weak incentives to get their preferred incumbents reelected
but where we happen to be able to observe the phenomenon clearly. Although the specics might
vary by electoral system, one can only imagine how much more prominent this type of strategic
behavior by the parties may occur in high-stakes elections, especially those in which parties are
powerful. In general, political parties have incentives to keep their incumbents in oce; therefore,
it is rational for them to try to actively help vulnerable incumbents gain an advantage over their
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challengers. In Spain, as the Senate is a relatively weak institution, parties view it as either a
place of retirement for loyal politicians or a training ground for younger, promising ones. Thus,
although they have an interest in getting their chosen politician elected, the stakes for parties are
relatively low. Presumably, as the stakes become higher, the stronger become the incentives of
the parties to help their incumbents. Their opportunities to do so, however, might vary according
to the conditions and characteristics of a given election. In other contexts, parties might supply
organizational support, help with fundraising, coordinate public endorsements, discourage talented
within-party challengers, provide key promotions, and oer high-prole appointments, for example.
More research is needed to understand the impact of party actions on incumbency advantage in
developed democracies other than Spain.
In the remainder of the paper, I rst review the existing literature on the sources of incumbency
advantage. Then, I describe the characteristics of the Spanish senatorial elections and the data
employed in the analyses. Next, I provide an intuition about the concept of incumbency advantage,
describe the specic methodology used for the estimations, identify the empirical strategy used to
gauge how much of the observed incumbency advantage comes from the particular mechanism of
strategic ballot position, and make a couple of other methodological points. Finally, I present the
results and conclude.
3.1 Literature Review
There is a vast literature exploring dierent potential sources of incumbency advantage. However,
we have yet to have a clear understanding of all the sources behind this phenomenon.
The literature on the causes of the incumbency advantage in the U.S. is the most extensive.
Perhaps because political parties in the U.S. are not perceived to be as powerful at the national
level as the candidates themselves, this literature has focused primarily on the strategies incumbents
employ to improve their electoral odds. Scholars have investigated whether incumbents generate
such advantage by ideologically aligning themselves to their constituents (Mayhew, 1974; Serra and
Moon, 1994); bringing pork to the district (Mayhew, 1974; Fiorina, 1980; Feldman and Jondrow,
1984; Stein and Bickers, 1994, 1997; Alvarez and Saving, 1997; Levitt and Snyder, 1997); focusing
on constituency service (Fiorina, 1977; Johannes and McAdams, 1981; Fiorina, 1981; Yiannakis,
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1981; Johannes, 1984; Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina, 1987; Serra and Cover, 1992; Serra, 1994; Camp-
bell, 1983; Parker and Parker, 1985); raising high levels of campaign funds (Glantz, Abramowitz
and Burkart, 1976; Jacobson, 1978, 1980; Abramowitz, 1991); scaring o high-quality challengers
(Levitt and Wolfram, 1997; Canon, 1990; Cox and Katz, 1996); and engaging in activities that
might increase their name recognition (Stokes and Miller, 1962; Mayhew, 1974; Abramowitz, 1975;
Ferejohn, 1977; Romero, 1996), among others.
The few studies of the sources of incumbency advantage in other developed countries seem to
have followed the lead of the U.S. literature and examine the same type of activities. For example,
analyzing British parliamentary elections, Gaines (1998) nds that the recent focus of MPs on
constituency service has not resulted in a higher level of incumbency advantage. Migueis (2010)
nds that the nancial transfers from the Portuguese central government to its municipalities are
not the main driver of incumbency advantage in their municipal elections. Hirano (2007) examines
oce-holding benets and candidate quality as explanations for the success of LDP candidates in
Japanese lower house elections. Heintzman (1991) nds that the advantage of the incumbents in
the 1988 Canadian elections cannot be explained by their higher levels of campaign funds.
In summary, even though the literature on political parties has long identied them as organiza-
tions that aim to foster the electoral success of their aliates (Aldrich, 1995), the literature on the
causes of incumbency advantage has seldom focused on parties' actions. The evidence presented
here suggests that parties' behavior is a potential source of incumbency advantage worth exploring,
especially in electoral contexts in which parties are powerful.
3.2 Spanish Senatorial Elections and Data
The elections to the Spanish Senate provide an interesting opportunity to look for new sources of
incumbency advantage because the commonly studied sources are unlikely to be present. This is
the case for several reasons:
First, the Spanish Senate has little legislative power. It has most of its power subjugated to
the lower chamber of the Spanish legislature, called the Congress of Deputies. For example, most
pieces of legislation must be initiated by the Congress of Deputies and the Congress of Deputies
can override a Senate veto with a simple majority. This means that the ideological positions of
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senators make little dierence to policy making and that no senator can credibly take credit for
any particular piece of legislation that benets his or her constituents.
Second, senators in Spain do not have access to many resources that they can use to their electoral
advantage. For example, only the president, the two vice-presidents, and the four secretaries of the
chamber have personal assistants. In addition, Spanish senators have neither the resources nor the
opportunity to provide constituency services.
Furthermore, Spanish senators do not raise or control the funds for their electoral campaigns. The
government provides campaign funds, which are then controlled by the parties, not by individual
politicians.2 As a result, electoral campaigns tend to be party-centered rather than candidate-
centered. If there is a candidate mentioned in the campaign at all, it tends to be the party's
proposed candidate for the presidency, who is one of their candidates for the Congress of Deputies.
Rarely do electoral campaigns mention any of the candidates for the Senate.
As a result, senators' name recognition in Spain is extremely low.3 Given these conditions, if we
nd any signicant incumbency advantage in Spanish senatorial elections, we should expect that it
comes from sources other than those commonly explored in the incumbency advantage literature.
3.2.1 Characteristics of the Spanish Senatorial Elections
The Spanish Senate is composed of 264 members, 208 of whom are elected via a multimember
plurality system. The remaining 56 senators are appointed by the regional legislative assemblies.
This paper focuses on the election of those 208 members, which is the only instance in Spanish
national politics in which citizens cast their votes for candidates, rather than parties.
There are 59 districts in Spain.4 In the majority of districts, four senators are elected and voters
are allowed to vote for up to three dierent candidates, from the same or from dierent parties.5
2Electoral campaigns are publicly nanced as long as they stay within certain limits and the party is successful
in gaining some representation in the legislative branch.
3Senators, party leaders, and journalists interviewed estimated that less than one percent of the population would
be able to name one of his or her senators.
4There is one district for each of the 47 peninsular provinces, one for Ceuta, one for Melilla, and one for each of
the ten islands. Ibiza and Formentera share a district.
5The districts from the peninsula are given four senators each but the rest are given between three and one.
Mallorca, Gran Canaria, and Tenerife have three seats each and citizens are allowed two votes. Ceuta y Melilla have
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In order to optimize their results, the major parties usually nominate as many candidates to each
race as citizens have votes.
Because Spanish senatorial elections generate very little public interest, citizens have little knowl-
edge about the characteristics of particular candidates. Thus, despite the fact that citizens cast
their votes for particular candidates within a party rather than for a party in general, most citizens
cast their votes based solely on partisan considerations. As a result, two factors largely determine
outcomes in Spanish senatorial elections. The rst factor is the popularity of the party. The second
is the order of the candidates on the ballot, conditional on the party's popularity. For example, in
districts where four senators are elected, the rst three seats often go to all the candidates of the
most popular party in that district.6 The remaining seat tends to go to one of the candidates from
the second most popular party, usually the one listed rst on the ballot. Based on party popularity
and ballot position alone, we can predict 90% of the winners in the Spanish senatorial elections
from 1977 to 2008.7
Up until 2010, candidates had to be listed on the ballot by the alphabetical order of their last
names.8 In 2010, the law was changed to eliminate the alphabetical rule and give parties the power
to freely decide the order in which candidates appear on the ballot. Here, I focus only on the
elections that occurred while the order was determined by the last names of the candidates, that
is, the elections from 1977 to 2008.
3.2.2 Data
The analyses employ electoral results for the ten elections that took place after Francisco Franco
died and Spain re-instituted its democracy. The raw data were provided by the Interior Ministry
two seats each and citizens are also allowed two votes. Menorca, Ibiza-Formentera, Fuerteventura, Gomera, Hierro,
Lanzarote, and La Palma have one seat each and citizens are allowed one vote.
6As mentioned earlier, major parties tend to nominate as many candidates as votes given to citizens. In districts
with four seats, citizens are given three votes and, thus, major parties usually nominate three candidates.
7Given that the elections for the Senate happen simultaneously to the elections for the Congress of Deputies,
where citizens vote for parties, we can construct a measure of party popularity at the district level based on the
results of the Congress of Deputies election in the districts.
8From 1977 until 1982, the Senate ballot listed the candidates in alphabetical order, not grouping them by party
and simply indicating their party aliation next to each name. Starting in 1986 and up until the 2008 election, the
ballot listed the candidates grouped by party, and within each party, candidates were listed in alphabetical order.
Thus, in all the elections from 1977 until 2008, the order of the candidates within each party was based on the
candidates' last names.
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of Spain.9 The data were provided at the level of the polling station for the elections from 1986 to
2008 and at the level of the districts for the rst three elections.10 For the analyses presented here,
the observations were aggregated at the district level.
3.3 Incumbency Advantage: Definition and Methodology
The initial goal of the analysis is to estimate the electoral advantage that Spanish senatorial in-
cumbents have over their challengers, which in multimember districts includes challengers from the
incumbents' own party.
Most scholars have studied the phenomenon in single-member districts. In that type of election,
incumbency advantage is usually understood as the benet derived from: (1) holding oce for at
least a term, (2) being a high-quality candidate, and (3) deterring high-quality challengers from
entering the race (Cox and Katz, 1996; Levitt and Wolfram, 1997). In multimember districts, the
composition of incumbency advantage would be the same except that the third component would
include the benet of deterring high-quality challengers from one's own party from entering the
race. In other words, in electoral systems with intra-party competition, the electoral advantage
of incumbents might come not only from attracting votes away from candidates from an opposing
party but also from luring votes away from candidates from their own party.11
3.3.1 Methodology for Estimating Incumbency Advantage
The design of the Spanish electoral system allows for an unusually precise measurement of in-
cumbency advantage. Spanish senatorial elections follow a multimember plurality system, where
multiple candidates from the same party run alongside each other when competing for multiple
9The data required cleaning and assembling. The identication of the incumbents in each election was particularly
elaborate as it involved merging the les using senators' names as the key variable. (The identication numbers
provided for both senators and parties were dierent each year). Because the names of the senators were sometimes
reported dierently (due to misspellings or to omission of middle names, for example), I had to manually modify
some of them. Every eort was made to ensure that the right matches occurred and that all of the incumbents were
identied.
10There are about 60,000 polling stations in Spain, each capturing the vote choice of 200 to 2,000 individuals.
Thus, the dataset consists of more than 13 million observations, containing information about the electoral outcomes
in each of the polling stations of the 11,181 candidates who ran for the Senate in the period under study.
11See Ariga (2010) for a description of the dierent types of incumbency advantage that one encounters in multi-
member districts as compared to single-member electoral systems.
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seats in a district. Following the method introduced by Hirano and Snyder (2009), we can estimate
the incumbents' advantage by comparing their electoral outcomes to those of their co-partisans
running in the same race. As the candidates being compared belong to the same party and are
running in the same district, their electoral outcomes should only dier in as much as their quality
and access to oce resources dier. Thus, the resulting measure of incumbency advantage is a rea-
sonable indicator of how much of an electoral boost senators enjoy due to (a) their already having
served at least one term, and (b) their being better candidates than their co-partisan counterparts.
Notice, however, that this measure of incumbency advantage does not capture the so-called \scare-
o eect" that incumbents might have on high-quality challengers from a dierent party. Thus,
it is worth noting that it might only be a partial measure of the total incumbency advantage of
senators in Spain. For the sake of simplicity, however, throughout the paper I will refer to this
measure as that of the incumbency advantage of senators in Spain.
In order to use this method to analyze Spanish Senate elections, we rst have to compute the
dependent variable. Because I would like the measure of the candidate's vote share to range from
zero to one across all districts, I use the following formula:
Vote Shareipdt =
Votes for Candidate i of Party p in District d at Time t
Valid Votes in District d at Time t
Number Votes per Citizen in District d

where the numerator is the total number of votes that candidate i of party p received in the district
d at time t, and the denominator is the maximum number of votes that candidate i would have
received in the district d at time t if every person who went to the polls voted for him or her, among
others. The denominator is composed of the total number of valid votes placed in district d at time
t divided by the number of votes that citizens are allowed to cast district d.
The models estimated are as follow:
Vote Shareipdt = 0 + 1Incumbent ipdt + pdt + ipdt (3.1)
where Vote Shareipdt is the vote share that candidate i from party p received in district d at time
t; Incumbent ipdt is a dummy variable indicating whether the candidate is an incumbent; pdt are
xed eects for each combination of district  party  year; and ipdt are the usual residuals.
The inclusion of xed eects for each combination of district, party, and year focuses the analysis
on electoral outcomes at the district level of co-partisans running together. Running this linear
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regression is equivalent to calculating the average dierence between the electoral outcome of in-
cumbents and that of their co-partisan non-incumbents running in the same district. The advantage
of performing the analysis this way is that the regression analyses indicate whether the dierence
between the two electoral outcomes is statistically dierent from zero.12;13
In addition to models estimating the incumbency advantage of senators in Spain, I also run
models estimating the eect that such advantage has on the candidates' probability of being elected.
These models take a form identical to the vote share model in 3.1 but use as a dependent variable
Elected ipdt, which takes the value of one if candidate ipd was elected at time t and zero otherwise.
3.3.2 Methodology for Estimating the Size of a Source
The source of incumbency advantage is also of interest, specically how much of the incumbents'
electoral advantage derives from their strategic positioning on the ballot.
Figure 3.1: Diagram of Casual Path
Incumbency
Status
Ballot
Position
Electoral
Outcome
a b
c
12Block bootstrap standard errors with 10,000 simulations are used throughout. I use district-years as blocks
when analyzing the entire time period. I use districts as blocks when analyzing the data before and after 1989. See
Bertrand, Duo and Mullainathan (2004) for a description of the virtues of block bootstrap.
13Given the model specication, the regressions only include observations of the parties that nominated at least
one incumbent and one non-incumbent.
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To gauge the impact of this particular mechanism, let us assume the basic causal chain described
in Figure 3.1, in which incumbency status has both a direct eect on electoral outcomes (path c)
and an indirect eect through the mechanism of candidate ballot position (the path a-b in the
diagram). Since the total eect of incumbency status on electoral outcomes is equal to the sum
of these two eects, direct and indirect, then we can estimate the indirect eect, which is the
mechanism-specic path that we are interested in, by calculating the dierence between the total
eect and the direct eect (Baron and Kenny, 1986).
Model 3.1 estimates the total eect that incumbency status has on electoral outcomes, ^1. To
estimate the direct eect that incumbency has on electoral outcomes, once we control for candidate
ballot position, we can use the following model:
Vote Shareipdt = 0
0
+ 1
0
Incumbent ipdt + (3.2)
+ 2
0
First on the Ballot ipdt +
+ 3
0
Third on the Ballot ipdt +
+ pdt + ipdt
where everything is as Model 3.1 but now we control for the position of the candidate on the ballot
by including whether candidate ipdt is listed rst or third among his co-partisans.14
The dierence between these two eects, ^1  ^10, should be a reasonable estimate of the indirect
eect that incumbency has on electoral outcomes through the specic mechanism of candidate
ballot position, as long as certain assumptions are met (Baron and Kenny, 1986; Glynn, 2011).
In addition to the usual assumptions necessary for unbiased estimates, we have to assume that
there is no interaction eect at the individual level between incumbency and ballot position. In
other words, we need to assume that being the incumbent and appearing rst on the ballot does
not have an eect above and beyond the sum of these two eects separately. Given the lack of
public attention to senatorial elections, incumbents have very little name recognition, and thus this
assumption is reasonable. Furthermore, as shown later, the data is consistent with this assumption.
As before, in addition to models estimating the direct and indirect eects of incumbency on
the vote share of the candidates, I also run models estimating the direct and indirect eects that
such advantage has on the candidates' probability of being elected. The procedures are the same
14The baseline category is being listed second.
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as described above, except that here the dependent variable is whether or not the candidate was
elected.
3.3.3 Heterogeneity of Effects Based on the Vulnerability of the Candidates
Throughout the analysis, I allow for the estimates to dier according to the popularity of the
candidates' party in the district in which they are running. In particular, for each district I
distinguish between the most popular party, the second most popular, and the rest.15 To make
these distinctions, I use the electoral outcomes of the simultaneous elections to the Congress of
Deputies, where citizens are asked to place votes for closed-party lists. The assumption made is
that elections to the Senate do not aect elections to the Congress of Deputies. That is to say,
there are no spillover eects, which seems reasonable given the characteristics of Spanish elections.
As described earlier, candidates face very dierent prospects of election depending on the pop-
ularity of their party. While all candidates from the most popular party in a district are almost
assured election, only one of the candidates from the second most popular party is likely to be
elected. For the candidates from the rest of the parties, the odds of gaining a seat are quite low.16
I estimate dierent eects based on the popularity of the parties to allow the candidates' level of
vulnerability to play a role in the analysis. For example, we may observe that the more vulnerable
incumbents receive more help from their parties than those who are in safer seats. This would be
consistent with recent ndings (Hirano and Snyder, 2009; Hirano, 2007).
3.3.4 Focus on Two Most Popular Parties in the Races
Lastly, the analysis focuses exclusively on the incumbency advantage of candidates in the two most
popular parties in each district. One could argue that the incumbency advantage observed in other
parties is qualitatively dierent than that in the two most popular parties. A candidate from a less
popular party cannot simply rely on his or her party's reputation to win a seat. To be elected, he
15It is worth noting that there are some parties that nominate candidates for the election to the Senate but do not
run in the election to the Congress of Deputies. For these parties, I do not have information about their popularity
in the district, and thus, they end up in the \rest" category.
16Historically, fewer than 1.5% of the candidates from parties other than the top two have been elected.
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or she must already be a popular gure.17 For this reason, I exclude from the study incumbents
from parties other than the top two.
Even though in Spanish senatorial elections there are, on average, candidates from 12 dierent
parties in each race, historically candidates from the two most popular parties in each district have
won 93 percent of the seats.18 Out of the 934 incumbents who ran in the elections under study, 89
percent belonged to one of the top two parties.
3.4 Results
The main results are summarized in Table 3.1. Incumbents from the two most popular parties are
estimated to have, on average, an electoral advantage of a little less than .7 percentage points over
their co-partisan non-incumbents, which, in spite of its small magnitude, is estimated to increase
the incumbents' probability of being elected by almost 25 percentage points. In general, Spanish
senatorial elections are won by small margins; thus, even a small increase in a candidate's vote
share can have a large eect on that candidate's probability of success. On average, the dierence
between winning and losing is only 3 percentage points.19
A more interesting story comes to light when we distinguish among incumbents based on the
popularity of their party in the district. As shown in Table 3.1, incumbents from the second most
popular party in a district have a signicantly higher incumbency advantage than those from the
most popular party, an eect of 1 percentage point compared to .5 percentage points. This larger
advantage provides incumbents from the second most popular party an increased probability of
being elected of over 55 percentage points. In other words, among candidates from the second
most popular party in the district, the probability of incumbents being elected is 55 percentage
points higher than that of their co-partisans running in the same race. In contrast, the electoral
advantage enjoyed by incumbents from the most popular party does almost nothing to boost their
17This is consistent with the information provided in the interviews.
18All but 11 of the remaining 158 seats went to candidates who ran as independents or whose party did not have
a ticket in the Congress of Deputies election, and therefore I do not have a measure of that party's popularity in the
district. Given the regional nature of the Senate, some parties form especially to push a specic regional issue in the
Senate and, therefore, only participate in those elections.
19This is calculated as the average dierence between the vote share of the candidate who was elected with the
least number of votes and the vote share of the candidate with the most number of votes among those candidates
that were not elected.
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probability of re-election. The probability of incumbents from the most popular party being elected
is estimated to be only 2 percentage points higher than that of their co-partisans in the race. This
makes sense, since as discussed earlier, all candidates from the most popular party are almost
assured to win a seat, regardless of their individual characteristics. Historically, only 7 percent of
the candidates from the most popular party did not get elected.
All told, the advantage of incumbents in Spanish senatorial elections is estimated to be responsi-
ble for the reelection of 81 senators out of the 731 that were reelected in this time period. However,
if we only look at vulnerable senators, that is senators from the most popular party, we nd that
their estimated incumbency advantage is responsible for the reelection of 76 of them, out of the
184 reelected.
Table 3.1: Incumbency Advantage of Top Two Parties in Spanish Senatorial Elections, 1977-2008
Races Analyzed
All Races All Symmetric Symmetric Races
Races where Top Two
Parties Captured
> 80% Vote Share
Dependent Dependent Dependent
Variable Variable Variable
Vote Share Elected Two-Party Elected Two-Party Elected
Vote Share Vote Share
All Incumbents .0067 .2481 .0091 .2471 .0077 .2688
(.0008) (.0198) (.0008) (.0207) (.0008) (.0278)
First Most Popular .0048 .0211 .0073 .0226 .0049 .0032
Party Incumbents (.0008) (.0087) (.0011) (.0093) (.0011) (.0070)
Second Most Popular .0095 .5617 .0116 .5497 .0112 .5969
Party Incumbents (.0007) (.0432) (.0009) (.0447) (.0010) (.0570)
Observations 1,583 1,583 1,498 1,498 853 853
Notes: Symmetric races are races where the two top parties nominated as many candidates as number of votes allowed
per citizen. The baseline category are the co-partisan non-incumbents in the same race. All regressions include xed
eects for each combination of year, district, and party. See formula 3.1 for a complete description of the linear model
used. Block bootstrap standard errors with 10,000 simulations are used throughout. Coecients signicant at the
95% level are shown in bold.
These results remain substantially the same whether we analyze the candidate's overall vote
share or the vote share received by the candidates out of the number of votes received by the top
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two parties in the district.20 Likewise, it makes little dierence whether we focus on all the races or
whether we limit ourselves to those races in which the two most popular parties captured at least
80 percent of the vote. (This can be seen by comparing the results from the dierent columns in
Table 3.1.)
3.4.1 Ballot Position Effects
After the rst few elections of Spain's new democracy, scholars noticed that the position of a can-
didate on the ballot for the Senate had a substantial eect on the candidate's electoral outcome
(Lijphart and Lopez Pintor, 1988). Candidates positioned further up the list were found to sys-
tematically fare much better than those further down. This was true regardless of whether the
candidates were grouped by party.21
Spanish senatorial elections are not unique in this regard. Scholars have found in many other
elections that the position of the candidates on the ballot can have an eect on their electoral suc-
cess.22 The so-called ballot position eects derive from the fact that the uninformed or unengaged
electorate tends to vote for the rst person on the ballot, since they do not have the information
necessary to distinguish between the candidates in any other way. If there are multiple candidates
for each party, as is the case in the Spanish elections to the Senate, the rst candidate listed for
each party will tend to do better than the last candidate listed for that same party. The idea here
is that the electorate might have strong party preferences but might not have enough information
to have an opinion about the dierent candidates from the same party.
Using a similar methodology as was used to estimate the advantage of incumbents, we can
estimate the ballot position eects for the period under study.23 As shown in Table 3.2, I nd
20Note that to compute this variable, we need to limit ourself to races that are so-called \symmetric," dened as
races where both major parties nominate as many candidates as votes allowed per citizen.
21As mentioned earlier, starting in 1986 the ballot went from listing all candidates in alphabetical order, regardless
of party aliation, to grouping candidates by parties and then listing them in alphabetical order within each party.
22There is an extensive literature on the subject matter. See for example Brook and Upton (1974); Upton and
Brook (1974); Robson and Walsh (1974); Taebel (1975); Upton and Brook (1975); Kelley and McAllister (1984);
Darcy (1986); Bowler, Donovan and Happ (1992); Darcy (1998).
23In these analyses, instead of using a dummy indicating who the incumbents are, we simply have two dummies,
one indicating whether the candidate was listed rst and another indicating whether the candidate was listed third. I
use the same dependent variables and continue to use xed eects for every combination of year, district, and party.
As before, I limit the analysis to the top two parties in the districts.
42
strong ballot position eects in Spanish senatorial elections. From 1977 to 2008, being positioned
rst on the ballot, compared to being positioned second, is estimated to increase a candidate's
vote share by 1 percentage point on average. This translates into an increased probability of being
elected of 35 percentage points. Once again, if we distinguish among candidates based on party
popularity, we nd that ballot position eects have much larger consequences for candidates from
the second most popular party than for those from the most popular party in the district. Being
placed rst on the ballot, as opposed to being placed second, increases the probability of being
elected by only 4 percentage points for candidates from the most popular party but by fully 66
percentage points for candidates from the second most popular party. Again, this disparity makes
sense since candidates from the most popular party are already very likely to win, so an extra
percentage point of the vote share makes little dierence.24
Table 3.2: Ballot Position Eects in Spanish Senatorial Elections, 1977-2008
Dependent Variable
Vote Share Elected
All Candidates from Top Two Parties
- First on the Ballot .0100 .3488
(.0007) (.0130)
- Third on the Ballot -.0060 -.0541
(.0009) (.0114)
First Most Popular Party Candidates
- First on the Ballot .0104 .0376
(.0012) (.0100)
- Third on the Ballot -.0068 -.0434
(.0012) (.0104)
Second Most Popular Party Candidates
- First on the Ballot .0095 .6616
(.0006) (.0258)
- Third on the Ballot -.0053 -.0732
(.0010) (.0173)
Notes: The baseline category are the co-partisans in the same race that are listed second on the ballot. All regressions
include xed eects for each combination of year, district, and party. Block bootstrap standard errors with 10,000
simulations are used throughout. Coecients signicant at the 95% level are shown in bold.
24Note that being moved further down the list, from second to third, also has some negative eects on the candidate's
vote share but the magnitude of such eects are much smaller than those going from rst to second. For details see
Table 3.2.
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The eects of ballot position on a candidate's vote share is estimated to be the same regardless of
whether the party has an incumbent running. Table 3.3 shows the estimated ballot position eects
for all the two most popular parties as well as for only those that had no incumbents running. The
dierences between the estimates are not statistically signicant. This suggests that the estimated
ballot position eects are not driven by the strategic position of incumbents on the ballot. The
data is consistent, therefore, with the assumption of no interaction eect at the individual level
between incumbency and ballot position.
Table 3.3: Ballot Position Eects by Party Type, 1977-2008
Dependent Variable: Vote Share
Parties Analyzed
All Top Only Top Two
Two Parties Parties Without
Incumbents
All Candidates
- First on the Ballot .0100 .0096
(.0007) (.0016)
- Third on the Ballot -.0060 -.0076
(.0009) (.0020)
First Most Popular Party Candidates
- First on the Ballot .0104 .0106
(.0012) (.0037)
- Third on the Ballot -.0068 -.0104
(.0012) (.0038)
Second Most Popular Party Candidates
- First on the Ballot .0095 .0091
(.0006) (.0009)
- Third on the Ballot -.0053 -.0059
(.0010) (.0018)
Notes: The baseline category are the co-partisans in the same race that are listed second on the ballot. All regressions
include xed eects for each combination of year, district, and party. Block bootstrap standard errors with 10,000
simulations are used throughout. Coecients signicant at the 95% level are shown in bold.
3.4.2 Parties' Strategic Behavior
Scholars were not the only ones who noticed the eects of ballot positioning on electoral outcomes.
Based on the evidence presented here and interviews with party leaders, it seems that after the
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rst few elections, the parties became aware of it too and started to exploit this phenomenon to
help reelect their most vulnerable incumbents.25
The nomination of candidates for Spanish national elections is controlled by the parties (Montabes
and Ortega, 1999). Through a centralized process, parties nominate candidates for both the Senate
and the Congress of Deputies.26 Parties are known to wield this power to enforce party discipline
among legislators (Field, 2006), and they seem not to be reluctant to use it. For example, in the
time period under study, only 50% of the senators ended up running for reelection.
Based on interviews with party leaders, only incumbents who please their party while in oce
are nominated to run again once the term is up. It seems, then, that in the context of the Spanish
Senate, the main electoral benet of serving in oce is the opportunity to show one's party leaders
that one can legislate in accordance with their wishes. Given the low interest of the public and
the importance of one's party aliation, senators who wish to remain in oce will work to please
their party. Unlike in other democracies, such as the U.S., the main constituency for senators is
not voters but their own party leaders.
Once an incumbent is chosen to run for reelection, however, it is in the parties' interest to help
him or her succeed.27 As noted before, candidates from the most popular party in each district
have a high probability of being elected. Incumbents from these parties are quite safe and do not
require assistance. However, the same cannot be said about the candidates from the second most
popular party. Most of the time, only one of these candidates will win a seat, and almost always,
it will be the candidate from the party who is listed rst on the ballot.28 Ballot positioning for
these candidates is, thus, of the highest importance. Given that the order of the candidates on
the ballot was done alphabetically during the period studied, if the party leaders involved in the
candidate selection process wanted to help vulnerable incumbents get reelected, they had to choose
25During the 2011 electoral campaign, I conducted several interviews of party leaders involved in the candidate
nomination process from the major parties in Spain. In addition, I interviewed senators, campaign managers, and
political journalists.
26Even though the major parties in Spain utilize some sort of primary system in order to gauge the popularity of
the candidates among the rank and le members at the local level, the ultimate decision-making power resides with
the party leaders.
27After all, if party leaders decide to nominate an incumbent to run for reelection it is because they are pleased
with their performance.
28This is true 89% of the time.
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the running mates of the incumbents with last names further down the alphabet. This type of
strategic nominating behavior was suspected by Montabes and Ortega (2002), who analyzed the
2000 Spanish senatorial elections and found that despite the alphabetical rule, incumbents were
disproportionally positioned rst on the ballot, especially when they were in vulnerable positions.29
Table 3.4: Likelihood of Ballot Position by Candidate and Party Types, 1979-2008
Dependent Variable
First Third
On the Ballot On the Ballot
One Incumbent Running from the Party (n=1,148)
All Incumbents .4016 -.2124
(.0372) (.0280)
First Most Popular Party Incumbents .2263 -.1053
(.0547) (.0456)
Second Most Popular Party Incumbents .5714 -.3163
(.0483) (.0321)
Dierence Between the Two -.3451 .2111
(.0730) (.0563)
Two Incumbents Running from the Party (n=435)
All Incumbents .0759 -.0586
(.0568) (.0604)
First Most Popular Party Incumbents .0424 -.0466
(.0641) (.0674)
Second Most Popular Party Incumbents .2222 -.1111
(.1140) (.1426)
Dierence Between the Two -.1798 .0645
(.1298) (.1585)
Notes: The baseline category are the co-partisan non-incumbents in the same race. All regressions include xed
eects for each combination of year, district, and party. Throughout, block bootstrap standard errors with 10,000
simulations are used. Coecients signicant at the 95% level are shown in bold.
More generally, we can nd evidence of the parties' strategic placement of incumbents on the
ballot (see Table 3.4). Incumbents are much more likely to be placed rst on the ballot and less
likely to be placed third than their non-incumbent co-partisans across the board. Further, we nd
stronger dierences in probabilities between incumbents and non-incumbents in parties that are
29Bagues and Esteve-Volart (2012) argued a similar exploitation of the nomination process. They argued that
parties were choosing female candidates based on their last name, in order to ensure that they be placed on disad-
vantageous positions on the ballot.
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likely to only gain one seat. As shown in Table 3.4, incumbents from the second most popular
party are 57 percentage points more likely to be placed rst on the ballot than their co-partisan
counterparts, while incumbents from the most popular party are 23 percentage points more likely
to be placed rst on the ballot than the non-incumbents running from the same party in the same
race. These two coecients are statistically dierent from each other. Similarly, incumbents from
the second most popular party are 32 percentage points less likely to be placed third on the ballot
than their non-incumbent co-partisans, while incumbents from the most popular party are only 11
percentage points less likely to be placed third on the ballot than their running mates.30
We can see a similar story presented graphically in Figure 3.2, which shows the dierent distribu-
tion of last names for incumbents and non-incumbents of these two types of parties. As incumbents
are more vulnerable in the second most popular parties in the district, their running mates tend to
have last names that come from the last half of the alphabet. Far less skewed is the distribution of
last names of candidates running with incumbents who are more likely to retain their seats, that
is, those from the most popular party.
Lastly, these results are consistent with information collected in interviews with party leaders
involved in the candidate nomination process from the major parties in Spain. The current Secretary
General of the \Partido Popular" in Barcelona stated it clearly: \The order of the candidates on the
ballot is very important. [When the ballot order was alphabetical,] the last name of the incumbent
used to condition who his or her running mates could be. Choosing the running mates of vulnerable
incumbents based on last name was a practice that all political parties used to engage in. It simply
made sense. It was logical."31 Because in 2010 the alphabetic ordering was eliminated to give parties
the power to decide the ordering themselves, parties no longer need to engage in such behavior.
30These are the statistics for parties that have only one incumbent running. Similar distinctions are found when
two incumbents are running, although the coecients are much smaller. In addition, given the small number of
observations in these regressions, the coecients are also not statistically signicant.
31Quote in translation.
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Figure 3.2: Distribution of Last Names by Incumbency Status and Party Popularity
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3.4.3 Strategic Ballot Positioning as a Source of Incumbency Advantage
Using the methodology described earlier, we can explore the extent to which the observed incum-
bency advantage in Spanish senatorial elections derives from the mechanism of strategic ballot
positioning of vulnerable incumbents.
Table 3.5 shows the decomposition of the total incumbency advantage into direct and indirect
eects; the indirect eects are the mechanism specic path that we are interested in as they are
the eects that incumbency has on electoral outcomes through candidate ballot position. Based
on these analyses, I nd that the strategic position of incumbents on the ballot accounts for more
than half of the observed incumbency advantage of the senators in the two most popular parties in
Spain (.35 percentage points out of .67).
As this strategy is particularly used to help vulnerable incumbents, we should expect the eect
to be larger for incumbents from the second most popular party than for incumbents from the most
popular party. Table 3.5 shows that this is indeed the case. The strategic placement of incumbents
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on the ballot explains .56 percentage points of the advantage of incumbents from the second most
popular party, but only .20 percentage points of the advantage of incumbents from the most popular
party. The dierence between these two coecients is statistically signicant at the 95% level.
Table 3.5: Decomposition of Incumbency Advantage in Direct and Indirect Eects, 1979-2008
Dependent Variable
Vote Share Elected
Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect
Eect Eect Eect Eect Eect Eect
All Incumbents .0067 .0032 .0035 .2481 .0741 .1740
(.0008) (.0004) (.0004) (.0198) (.0177) (.0185)
First Most Popular Party Incumbents .0048 .0028 .0020 .0211 .0157 .0054
(.0008) (.0006) (.0006) (.0087) (.0083) (.0023)
Second Most Popular Party Incumbents .0095 .0039 .0056 .5617 .1839 .3778
(.0007) (.0006) (.0006) (.0432) (.0476) (.0411)
Dierence Between the Two -.0047 -.0011 -.0036 -.5406 -.1682 -.3724
(.0010) (.0008) (.0008) (.0446) (.0482) (.0412)
Notes: The baseline category are the co-partisan non-incumbents in the same race. See formula (1) for a description
of the linear model used to estimate the total eects. See formula (2) for a description of the linear model used to
estimate the direct eects. The indirect eects - the mechanism specic path - are the dierence between the direct
and total eects. All regressions include xed eects for each combination of year, district, and party. Throughout,
block bootstrap standard errors with 10,000 simulations are used. Coecients signicant at the 95% level are shown
in bold.
The evidence is even clearer once we consider that this practice did not begin in earnest until
after the rst few elections. As shown in Table 3.6, for incumbents from the two most popular
parties, placement on the ballot is an insignicant amount of the incumbency advantage observed
in elections before 1989, while placement on the ballot explains almost all of the advantage in
later elections.32 Ballot positioning accounts for only .12 percentage points of the advantage of .79
observed before 1989, but it accounts for .50 percentage points out of the advantage of .62 observed
from 1989 to 2008. The indirect eects of incumbency on electoral outcomes through candidate
32The year 1989 is chosen as the cut-o point because qualitatively it is around the time that the parties claim to
have started this strategic behavior. In addition, the data presents a structural break on that year, based on Wald
tests.
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ballot placement is found not to be statistically signicant before 1989, regardless of the popularity
of the party.33
Table 3.6: Composition of Incumbency Advantage in Two Time Periods: 1979-86 and 1989-2008
Dependent Variable
Vote Share Elected
Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect
Eect Eect Eect Eect Eect Eect
Elections from 1979 to 1986
All Incumbents .0079 .0067 .0012 .1625 .1234 .0391
(.0016) (.0012) (.0009) (.0340) (.0324) (.0236)
Most Popular Party Incumbents .0077 .0067 .0009 .0441 .0424 .0017
(.0019) (.0014) (.0011) (.0151) (.0152) (.0046)
Second Most Popular Party Incumbents .0084 .0067 .0017 .3655 .2675 .0980
(.0020) (.0015) (.0010) (.0864) (.0857) (.0591)
Dierence Between the Two -.0007 .0000 -.0008 -.3214 -.2251 -.0963
(.0021) (.0017) (.0012) (.0879) (.0878) (.0587)
Elections from 1989 to 2008
All Incumbents .0062 .0012 .0050 .2855 .0293 .2562
(.0006) (.0004) (.0005) (.0236) (.0168) (.0242)
Most Popular Party Incumbents .0033 .0009 .0024 .0097 .0024 .0073
(.0008) (.0006) (.0006) (.0096) (.0099) (.0036)
Second Most Popular Party Incumbents .0098 .0017 .0081 .6330 .0870 .5460
(.0008) (.0006) (.0008) (.0423) (.0454) (.0501)
Dierence Between the Two -.0065 -.0008 -.0057 -.6233 -.0846 -.5387
(.0012) (.0008) (.0010) (.0441) (.0459) (.0500)
Notes: The baseline category are the co-partisan non-incumbents in the same race. See formula (1) for a description
of the model used to estimate the total eects. See formula (2) for a description of the model used to estimate the
direct eects. The indirect eects{the mechanism specic path{are the dierence between the direct and total eects.
All regressions include xed eects for each combination of year, district, and party. Throughout, block bootstrap
standard errors with 10,000 simulations are used. Coecients signicant at the 95% level are shown in bold.
If we focus on the years when this practice was prevalent, we nd stronger evidence that this
mechanism was particularly used to favor the more vulnerable incumbents. For incumbents of the
33During the rst few elections in Spain, party leaders had yet to realize the importance of ballot position, however,
incumbents are nevertheless found to have a statistically signicant advantage over their co-partisan counterparts.
Based on conversations with party leaders, the incumbency advantage of the rst few elections was due to the
popularity of the candidates themselves as well as a more candidate-centered campaigns. The rst few elections were
more candidate-centered because (a) the parties were still forming and were not yet known entities to the electorate
(in other words, they did not have a brand name yet), (b) the Senate was still taken as a serious legislative chamber
and thus citizens paid attention to their elections, and (c) the candidates were popular gures, for the most part.
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second most popular party, ballot position accounts for .81 percentage points out of their estimated
advantage of .98 percentage points. For incumbents of the most popular party, it accounts for .24
percentage points out of their estimated advantage of .33. The indirect eects for the two types of
parties are statistically dierent from each other at the 95% level.
In terms of the probability of being elected during this period, incumbents from the most popular
party are found to have no statistically signicant advantage over their co-partisans. Incumbents
from the second most popular party, however, are estimated to be 63 percentage points more likely
to be elected than their running mates, and most of their advantage is estimated to derive from
their strategic placement on the ballot.
In summary, we nd strong evidence that, after the rst few elections, Spanish parties nomi-
nated the running mates of vulnerable incumbents based on their last name in order to boost the
incumbents' prospects for re-election. This strategic party behavior is found to be the main source
of the observed incumbency advantage in the elections between 1989 and 2008. The remaining
observed incumbency advantage, measured by the direct eects, is small and more often than not
insignicant, and it might simply be due to the quality dierential between the candidates. As
some of the incumbents' running mates were chosen based primarily on last name, their quality as
politicians might not be comparable to that of the incumbents.
3.5 Conclusion
The literature on the sources of incumbency advantage has focused primarily on the actions of
individual politicians and, for the most part, neglected activities in which parties engage to boost
the electoral chances of their aliated incumbents. Based on the literature on political parties,
however, it is reasonable to expect parties to help their incumbents get reelected. Parties might be
behind some of the incumbents' advantage over their challengers, especially in elections where the
stakes are high and parties are powerful. In this paper, I nd evidence of a meaningful incumbency
advantage created not by the actions of the incumbents themselves but by the actions of their
parties.
In particular, I study elections to the Spanish Senate, a context in which the commonly studied
sources of incumbency advantage are not likely to be present. Using the method introduced by
51
Hirano and Snyder (2009), I estimate the incumbency advantage of senators from 1979 to 2008.
Exploiting the multimember district system of the Senate in Spain, I compare the electoral outcomes
of incumbents to those of non-incumbents from the same party running in the same race, and
estimate the eects of the incumbent's oce holder benets and quality dierential on electoral
outcomes.
I nd a small but signicant incumbency advantage, estimated to increase the probability of all
incumbents being reelected by almost 25 percentage points but that of vulnerable incumbents by
more than 50 percentage points. I also nd that the main source of such advantage derives from
the behavior of the parties, which help their more vulnerable senators get reelected by ensuring
that they be placed rst on the ballot. Since during the elections studied the law stipulated that
candidates be ordered on the ballot alphabetically, in order to ensure that incumbents be placed
rst, parties had to nominate other candidates with last names further down the alphabet.
As the ndings of this paper suggest, parties have an incentive to use whatever resources are
available to help their incumbents remain in power, especially those in vulnerable positions. To this
end, parties might supply organizational support, help with fundraising, coordinate public endorse-
ments, discourage talented within-party challengers, provide key promotions, and oer high-prole
appointments, among others. The case of the Spanish Senate is likely just the tip of the iceberg
since their elections have relatively low stakes, and more research is needed to fully understand the
role of parties in causing the incumbency advantage observed in other developed countries.
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4
Challenger Quality and the Incumbency Advantage
The incumbency advantage is an important phenomenon in U.S. politics, but even after years of
study it is not clear what it represents. Theoretically, scholars have pointed to three main factors:
(i) incumbents might be of higher \quality" than the average candidate, (ii) holding oce might
provide resources to incumbents, which they can use to win votes, and (iii) challengers who run
against incumbents might be of lower \quality" than the average politician. Decomposing the
incumbency is important for normative reasons as well as positive reasons. If the incumbency
advantage is mainly caused by factor (iii) { for example, because high-quality candidates tend to
wait for open seats { then it may indicate a sub-optimal degree of competition in the electoral
system and possibly a need for reform. On the other hand, if the incumbency advantage is mainly
due to factor (i) { for example, because on-the-job learning occurs in politics as in other jobs {
then it might reect a desirable outcome of a well-functioning electoral system.
Many scholars have attempted to estimate the magnitude of the dierent components of the
incumbency advantage.1 One reason it is dicult to estimate the size of component (iii) is that it
is dicult to estimate the eect of facing a quality challenger in the race, which is one of the key
1A number of papers { e.g. Erikson (1971), Cover and Mayhew (1977), Nelson (1978), Payne (1980), Alford and
Brady (1989), Gelman and King (1990) { focus on estimating the aggregate incumbency advantage. While they
recognize that the incumbency advantage may be due to a variety of factors, they focus on the aggregate estimate
and do not attempt to decompose it. Other papers, including Johannes and McAdams (1981), Levitt and Wolfram
(1997), Cox and Katz (1996), Ansolabehere, Snyder and Stewart (2000), and Hirano and Snyder (2009), attempt to
decompose the incumbency advantage in various ways. For example, Cox and Katz (1996) attempt to disaggregate
the incumbency advantage into \direct," \scare-o," and \quality" eects. In addition, a number of papers in the
literature on campaign nance also provide a decomposition of the incumbency advantage by isolating the eect
of campaign spending on election outcomes independent of both incumbency and challenger quality. These papers
include Jacobson (1980), Abramowitz (1988), Green and Krasno (1988), and Gerber (1998). However, none of these
papers deal explicitly with the problem of strategic challenger entry in the estimation.
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parameters needed for its estimation.2 If high-quality challengers tend to wait until incumbents
retire or get into trouble to run for a seat { e.g. because they are especially strategic in their
behavior { then the observed sample will be skewed toward races where high-quality challengers
face weak incumbents. Similarly, if the challengers who decide to run against stronger incumbents
are mainly low-quality { because they are less strategic, i.e., less sensitive to their chances of success
{ then, again, the sample we observe will be skewed toward races where incumbents face low-quality
challengers.3
This strategic thinking on the part of the potential challengers seems particularly plausible in
light of the fact that one of the best measures of candidate quality is previous oceholder experience.
Intuitively, many of the strongest candidates are elected ocials who hold oces similar to those
they are seeking and with similar constituencies { e.g., state legislators running for the U.S. House,
state representatives running for the state senate, or state attorneys general running for governor.
Given that current oceholders face a high opportunity cost of running for higher oce, since they
typically must give up their current oce in order to do so, they are probably likely to wait for
their odds of success to be high (e.g., for the incumbent to retire or get in trouble, or for their party
to be strongly favored). Not surprisingly, then, previous empirical work has found strong evidence
of strategic challenger behavior.4
If high-quality challengers, such as current oceholders, exhibit strategic entry behavior, then
conventional OLS estimates of the eect of challenger quality on electoral success and of the in-
cumbency advantage may be biased since challenger quality may be endogenous to the vote. To
account for this possibility, we adopt an alternative approach. We use term limits as an instrument
for challenger quality. Politicians who are term-limited cannot exercise one of their most popular
2The other component is the eect incumbency has on the probability of facing a quality opponent. Several
theoretical papers formalize the scare-o eect. See, for example, Banks and Kiewiet (1989), Epstein and Zemsky
(1995), Gordon, Huber and Landa (2007), and Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2008).
3Another potential problem arises if low-quality incumbents tend to retire, since we would not observe what would
have happened to them had they run. Instead, the observed sample will be skewed toward high-quality incumbents,
who do well in their re-election attempts in large part because they are high-quality, not because they are incumbents.
Ansolabehere and Snyder (2004) investigate the issue of incumbents' strategic retirement and conclude that it does
not signicantly bias the estimated incumbency advantage. We, therefore, do not incorporate this in our analysis.
4Relevant papers include Jacobson and Kernell (1983), Bianco (1984), Bond, Covington and Fleisher (1985),
Krasno and Green (1988), Jacobson (1989), Stone, Maisel and Maestas (2004), Kiewiet and Zeng (1993), Carson,
Engstrom and Roberts (2007), and Carson and Roberts (2013).
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options { running again for the oce they currently hold { and must either run for a dierent oce
or temporarily retire from politics. As a result, many term-limited candidates run for another oce
when they would not otherwise. This yields an exogenous source of variation in the presence of
quality challengers, and therefore a plausible instrument.5
More specically, in this paper, we study state senate elections, and measure challenger quality
in terms of previous experience as a state representative. We then use the number of term-limited
state representatives who reside in a given state senate district as an instrument for the presence
of a high-quality challenger.6 We nd that the instrumental variables (IV) estimates are similar
to the OLS estimates. Most importantly, using IV does not substantially reduce the estimated
incumbency advantage. It also does not substantially reduce the estimated eect of challenger
quality. In fact, the IV estimates of the incumbency advantage and the eect of challenger quality
are both slightly larger than the corresponding OLS estimates.
We also show that the instrumental variables are quite strong in the rst-stage. Thus, although
we nd evidence of strategic behavior by experienced challengers (consistent with previous studies),
this behavior does not seem to bias the second stage estimates. Why not? Evidently, the strategic
choices by experienced challengers are not driven by unmeasured variation in incumbent quality.
That is, high quality incumbents and low quality incumbents are, to a rst approximation, equally
able to scare o experienced challengers. Strategic choices are important, but they appear to
depend mainly on variables that are measured fairly accurately, such as district safety, partisan
tides, and incumbency status per se. In addition, decisions about whether to run for re-election and
when to run for another oce are probably driven by a variety of idiosyncratic factors { outside
employment opportunities, family issues, health, age, the drudgery of campaigning, and, perhaps
most importantly, satisfaction or lack of satisfaction with political life and overall political ambition.
Overall, then, our ndings indicate that { at least for the case of state legislatures { strategic
challenger entry is less of a problem in estimating the incumbency advantage than has been pre-
viously thought. In addition, using our estimates, we nd that between 30 and 40 percent of the
5The argument is similar to that in Ansolabehere and Snyder (2004), which uses term limits to construct instru-
mental variables for incumbents, but not for challengers.
6Intuitively, the greater the number of term-limited Democratic (Republican) representatives residing within the
boundaries of a senate district, the greater the probability of the Republican (Democratic) senate incumbent being
challenged by a quality challenger in the form of a term-limited representative.
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incumbency advantage in state legislative races is the result of \scaring o" experienced challengers;
an estimate consistent with the literature.
4.1 Methods and Data
Let us consider the model typically used to estimate the incumbency advantage, which decomposes
the two-party vote share into incumbency eects, challenger quality eects, the normal party vote,
and national swings:
Vit = 1Iit + 2Qit + 3Nit + t + it (4.1)
where:
 Vit is the two-party vote-share received by the Democratic candidate in district i at time t.
 Iit equals 1 if a Democratic incumbent runs for reelection in district i at time t, - 1 if a
Republican incumbent is seeking reelection, and 0 if no incumbent runs.
 Qit equals 1 if there is a Republican, high-quality candidate in the race (excluding the in-
cumbent), -1 if there is a Democratic, high-quality candidate in the race (excluding the
incumbent), 0 if either the challenger to the incumbent is not high-quality, or both or none
of the candidates in the open race are high-quality.
 Nit is the normal vote, capturing the underlying division of partisan loyalties in district i at
time t.
 t are time xed eects, which capture the partisan tides at each time t.
 it are the usual residuals.
Note that Qit is constructed so that we expect 2 < 0. For example, the presence of a quality
Republican challenger in the race (i.e., Qit=1) should decrease the vote-share received by the
Democratic candidate (i.e., 2  1 should result in a decrease of Vit, therefore we expect 2 to
be negative). Similarly, the presence of a quality Democratic challenger in the race (i.e., Qit=-1)
should increase the vote-share received by the Democratic candidate (i.e., 2  (-1) should result
in a positive change of Vit; therefore we expect 2 to be negative).
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Notice that this model does not account for the strategic entry of quality challengers. The
presence of a quality challenger in the race is, however, likely to be correlated with both the
presence of an incumbent seeking reelection as well as with the incumbent's a priori expected
performance in the polls. In other words, prospective quality challengers might choose only to
run when either there is no incumbent or the incumbent defending his or her seat is perceived as
electorally weak and expected to loose in the upcoming election. This would create a situation in
which the presence of a quality challenger (Qit) would be correlated with the incumbent's electoral
weakness (call it Wit), which in turn is a determinant of our dependent variable (Vit). Failing to
control forWit would bias our estimates of the eect of facing a quality challenger (^2).7 Intuitively,
if we only observe high-quality challengers when incumbents are weak and we do not control for
such weakness, then we will be assuming that the positive results achieved by the challenger are
all due to his being a quality candidate and not to the incumbent's lack of strength. On the other
hand, if the only quality candidates that decide to face the incumbent are those of lesser quality and
with less to lose, then we would be underestimating the eect that a more representative quality
challenger would have on the electoral outcome. In short, this model, which for practical matters
we will call the OLS model, produces biased estimates of the eect of quality challengers and, as a
result, it also produces biased estimates of the incumbency advantage because it fails to adequately
control for the presence of quality challengers in the race.
To be able to estimate the eect of quality challengers without this type of omitted variable bias,
we use an instrumental variable analysis by taking advantage of the exogenous increase of quality
challengers produced by term limits in state legislatures.8 More specically, we use the number of
term-limited state representatives to instrument for the presence of quality challengers in the state
upper house elections. The idea is the following. Usually the costs of running for higher oce are
rather large since state lower house members are usually required to give up their current oce in
order to do so. When they become term-limited, however, the option of staying put is no longer
available and, thus, the costs of running for the state's upper house decrease substantially. In these
7The stylized vote share model that would capture this would be as follows: Vit = 
0
1Iit+
0
2Qit+
0
3Nit+
0
4Wit+

0
t + 
0
it. When estimating equation (1) then, it = 
0
4Wit + 
0
it, where Wit is correlated with Qit. Omitting Wit from
the model, makes the estimate of the eect of quality challengers (2) suer from omitted variable bias.
8We follow Ansolabehere and Snyder (2004) in using term limits as an instrumental variable.
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circumstances, we expect a higher number of high-quality candidates to decide to challenge the
incumbent than they would have otherwise. The number of term-limited representatives residing
within a senate district can, thus, help predict the presence of a quality challenger for that senate
district.
Statistically, we follow a two-stage least squares framework, and estimate the following system:
Vit = 1Iit + 2Qit + 3Nit + t + it (Second Stage)
Qit = 1TDit + 2T
R
it (+3T2
D
it + 4T2
R
it) + 5Iit + 6Nit + t + it (First Stage) (4.2)
where the new variables are:
 TDit and TRit are the number of term-limited Democratic and Republican representatives re-
siding in senate district i at time t. Since we study general elections, we instrument for
challenger quality from the opposite party when there is an incumbent present. In other
words, we ignore the number of term-limited Democrats when instrumenting for challengers
of a Democratic incumbent. Similarly, we ignore the number of term-limited Republicans
when we instrument for challengers of a Republican incumbent. Mathematically, this means
that we set TDit = 0 when Iit = 1 and, likewise, set T
R
it = 0 when Iit =  1.
 Because state lower house terms do not always coincide with state upper house terms, we
also need to consider the state representatives that are term-limited two years prior to the
election of their corresponding upper house seat. To capture these representatives we created
two additional instruments: T2Dit and T2
R
it . For simplicity sake, we perform the analysis with
and without these extra set of instruments. We call the one without: IV (i), and the one
with: IV (ii).
The top equation is simply equation 4.1 above. The bottom equation is the rst stage, in which
we predict challenger quality using the number of term-limited representatives by party, as well as
an indicator for incumbency, a measure of the normal vote, and time xed eects.
The key identifying assumption is that TDit and T
R
it (and T2
D
it and T2
R
it , for that matter) are
uncorrelated with Wit { i.e., the number of term-limited representatives eligible to run in a given
senate district in a given year is not correlated with the unmeasured weakness of the incumbent
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state senator in that district that year. This seems plausible. For example, term limits were
imposed well before any of the races in our sample.
Our analysis, then, focuses on the general elections for the upper houses from 2002 to 2010 in
eleven states that had legislative term limit laws in place during this period.9 We begin in 2002 to
avoid crossing major redistricting episodes and we focus on senate races because state legislators'
moves from the lower to the upper houses are a lot more common than moves from the upper to
the lower houses.
In regards to the construction of our variables, we follow previous work and dene challenger
quality in terms of prior oceholder experience. More specically, since we focus on state senate
elections, we identify as quality challengers those who currently are or have been state representa-
tives at some point during the last ten years.10
To measure the normal vote we use two standard approaches from the existing literature: (i)
district xed eects (Levitt and Wolfram 1997), and (ii) lagged vote share together with lagged
party control (Gelman and King 1990).11 Although the choice of specication does not aect our
conclusions, the estimated coecient on the Incumbency Status dummy is consistently larger in
the specication that uses lagged vote; this may be due to selection bias from dropping cases that
were uncontested in the previous election (that is, where there is no observation for lagged vote).
In order to construct our instruments, we identify the number of term-limited state representa-
tives eligible to run for each senate district. Matching representatives to senate districts is chal-
9Fifteen states have imposed limits on state legislators at some point during our sample period. However, we
can only include eleven of them in our analysis. We exclude Louisiana because its \top two" electoral system allows
for two members of the same party to run against each other, Nevada and Oregon because they have too few cases,
Nebraska because it has a unicameral (and non-partisan) legislature, and Oklahoma because legislators become term-
limited based on the total number of years they have served regardless of the chamber. As a result, our study focuses
on Arkansas, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Maine, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Ohio, and South Dakota.
See Table A2 in the Appendix for a summary of the characteristics of the term limits legislation in these fteen states.
10Jacobson (1989, 2009), Squire (1992), Cox and Katz (2002), Carson, Engstrom and Roberts (2007), and many
others nd that candidates who previously held elective oce have signicantly larger vote shares and signicantly
higher probabilities of winning than other candidates. While scholars acknowledge that previous elective oce
experience is only one component of quality, it is an important component { at least from an electoral point of
view. Bond, Covington and Fleisher (1985), Krasno and Green (1988), and Canon (1990) have constructed more
comprehensive measures of quality. Carson and Roberts (2011) conclude that, \Despite numerous attempts to develop
more detailed codings of challenger quality... the simple dichotomy has typically proven just as reliable a predictor of
a competitive House election... we believe that trying to come up with yet another alternative measure of candidate
quality represents an area where further research is clearly unwarranted." (p. 151)
11Lagged party control is dened as 1 if the Democratic party won the last election, and - 1 if it was the Republican
party that won.
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lenging, because in most states there is no simple correspondence between state house and state
senate district boundaries; nor are state house districts nested inside state senate districts. Since a
candidate is required to be a resident of a senate district in order to run for the senate seat, we com-
piled representative addresses from candidate ling information available from Secretary of State
oces.12 In cases where both residential addresses and mailing addresses were available, we used
the residential address to maximize accuracy. The addresses were geocoded and matched with sen-
ate district shape les in GIS to identify the senate district for which a term-limited representative
was eligible to run for based on residency.
4.2 Results
Table 4.1 presents the estimated incumbency and quality challenger eects using each method. The
rst three columns use the district xed eects model (Model 1), and the last three columns use the
Gelman and King (1990) model with lagged vote and lagged party control (Model 2). Remember
that for each one of these models, we estimated the OLS model as well as two dierent IV analysis:
one with only TDit and T
R
it as instruments (IV i), the other with T
D
it and T
R
it as well as T2
D
it and
T2Rit (IV ii).
The rst thing to notice is that the estimated eect of quality challengers increases but by a
small amount once we get rid of the omitted variable bias by way of using instrumental variable
analyses. In Model 1, it goes from 3.5 percentage points of the vote share in the OLS model
to 4.5 or 3.6 percentage points depending on the IV model used. In Model 2, it goes from 4.9
percentage points to 6.9 or 7.5 percentage points. Perhaps more importantly, improving upon
the quality challenger control does not seem to aect the estimated incumbency advantage. To
determine how much strategic challenger entry aects incumbency advantage estimates, we can
compare the ordinary least squares (OLS) and instrumental variables (IV) estimates. The OLS
regressions produce estimates of the incumbency advantage ranging from 5.2 percentage points in
Model 1 to 7.3 percentage points in Model 2. Using term limits to instrument for challenger quality
12California and South Dakota do not have residency requirements, but given the strong norms against \carpet-
bagging" throughout the U.S. it is rare for candidates to run outside the area where they live. In any case, this
simply means there is measurement error in our instrumental variables. Montana has a unique residency requirement,
according to which a candidate for a state legislative oce must be \a resident of the county if it contains one or
more districts or of the district if it contains all or parts of more than one county." We incorporate this feature in
dening our instruments.
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results in slightly dierent estimates, as shown in the IV rows of Table 4.1. The IV (i) estimate of
the incumbency advantage is 5.8 percentage points in Model 1 and 8.4 percentage points in Model
2. In both model specications, the IV (i) estimates of incumbency advantage are a bit higher than
the conventional OLS estimates. However, Hausman tests indicate that the dierence between the
OLS and IV (i) estimates is not statistically signicant { for neither model can we reject the null
hypothesis that the OLS and IV (i) coecient estimates are equal. This includes the coecients
of both quality challenger eects and incumbency advantage. We arrive at very similar results and
conclusions comparing the OLS estimates to those of the IV (ii) models.13
Table 4.1: Incumbency and Quality Challenger Eects in U.S. State Senates, 2002-2010
Dependent Variable = Vote Share
District Fixed Eects Gelman and King (1990)
Model 1 Model 2
OLS IV i IV ii OLS IV i IV ii
Incumbency Status 0.052 0.058 0.052 0.073 0.084 0.087
(0.004) (0.010) (0.009) (0.006) (0.010) (0.009)
Quality Challenger -0.035 -0.045 -0.036 -0.049 -0.069 -0.075
(0.005) (0.016) (0.014) (0.005) (0.015) (0.013)
Lagged Vote Share 0.729 0.692 0.681
(0.035) (0.044) (0.042)
Lagged Party Control -0.029 -0.034 -0.036
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
District Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes No No No
Year Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 929 929 929 504 504 504
Hausman Test 0.464 0.004 2.028 4.999
[0.998] [1.000] [0.958] [0.660]
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. P-values are in square brackets. Coecients statistically signicant at
the 95 percent level of condence are shown in bold. The OLS models follow equation 4.1. The IV models follow the
equations described in 4.2. IV i include only TDit and T
R
it as instruments. IV ii also include T
D
it and T
R
it .
These ndings imply that strategic entry by experienced politicians does neither aect the esti-
mates of the eect of quality challengers nor the estimates of incumbency advantage. If experienced
politicians were systematically challenging only \weak" incumbents, then introducing an exogenous
13We performed the same analysis using as a dependent variable an indicator of whether the winner was the
Democratic candidate. We arrived at the same substantive conclusions. The IV estimates were very similar to the
OLS estimates and the Hausman test indicated that the dierences were not signicant.
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assignment of quality challengers through using IV would result in a dierent estimate of incum-
bency advantage. However, since our IV estimates are not signicantly dierent from the OLS
estimates, we can conclude that strategic entry by high-quality challengers was not noticeably af-
fecting the OLS estimates of incumbency advantage in the rst place. This conclusion holds true
if our instruments are indeed strong and excludable. We turn to examine this next.
4.2.1 Strength and Exogeneity of the Instruments
Table 4.2 shows the results of the rst-stage estimates for our IV analyses, which use the num-
ber of term-limited state representatives in a district to predict challenger quality in state senate
elections.14 Recall that the dependent variable Qit is dened to capture the experience of the chal-
lenger, signed so that it is positive when there is a Republican high-quality candidate challenging
the Democratic incumbent, negative when there is a Democratic high-quality candidate challeng-
ing the Republican incumbent, or capturing the dierence between the qualities of the candidates
when the seat is open (Republican - Democratic). As a result, we should expect a negative sign on
the coecient for the number of term-limited Democrats because a greater number of term-limited
Democratic representatives should result in a greater probability of a high-quality Democratic chal-
lenger (which is equivalent to a negative number of the dependent variable). Likewise, we should
expect a positive sign on the coecient for the number of term-limited Republicans because a
greater number of term-limited Republican representatives should result in a greater probability of
a high-quality Republican challenger. As before, Model 1 measures the normal vote using district
xed eects, while Model 2 measures the normal vote using the district's lagged vote share with
an indicator of the lagged party control.
14Even simple summary statistics indicate a high degree of strategic behavior by experienced challengers. Consider
all state senate races with an incumbent running. In districts with no term-limited state representatives (i.e., cases
where the instrument is 0) a high-quality challenger was present in 7% of the races. In districts with with at least one
term-limited state representative (i.e., cases where the instrument is positive), a high-quality challenger was present
in 47% of the races. Of these high-quality challengers, 41% were term-limited.
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Table 4.2: First-Stage Estimates
Dependent Variable = Quality Challenger
District Fixed Eects Gelman and King
Model 1 Model 2
IV i IV ii IV i IV ii
No. Term-Limited Democrats -0.191 -0.189 -0.261 -0.254
(0.040) (0.040) (0.053) (0.052)
No. Term-Limited Republicans 0.142 0.136 0.275 0.271
(0.035) (0.035) (0.044) (0.043)
No. Term-Limited Democrats (2 years prior) -0.088 -0.236
(0.044) (0.054)
No. Term-Limited Republicans (2 years prior) 0.134 0.203
(0.046) (0.046)
Incumbency Status 0.561 0.537 0.436 0.373
(0.025) (0.026) (0.038) (0.039)
Lagged Vote Share -1.392 -1.167
(0.239) (0.237)
Lagged Party Control -0.234 -0.201
(0.042) (0.041)
District Fixed Eects Yes Yes No No
Year Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
First-Stage F-Tests 18.6 12.4 31.1 25.3
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. P-values are in square brackets. Coecients statistically signicant at
the 95 percent level of condence are shown in bold. The F-Tests are performed on the null hypothesis that the
coecients on all instruments equal 0. The p-values of the F-Tests are all very close to zero.
The rst-stage regressions conrm the strength of our instruments; term limits have a substan-
tive impact on the probability of having a quality candidate in the race. The coecients on the
number of term-limited Democratic representatives and the number of term-limited Republican
representatives (at the time of the election or two years prior) range in magnitude from 8.8 per-
centage points to 27.5, depending on the model, and are all statistically signicant. F-tests are
performed for the joint hypothesis that all of the coecients on our instruments equal 0. Since the
p-values of the F-test is close to 0, we reject the null hypothesis that the coecients are equal to 0.
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The F-statistics, which provide a measure of information contained in the instruments, are much
larger than the standard benchmark of 10, indicating that our instruments are strong.15
As mentioned before, our analysis is only valid if our instruments, in addition to being strong, are
also exogenous. In other words, the number of term-limited representatives in a district should not
be correlated with the electoral vulnerability of the incumbent of the senate seat in that district.
We see no reason why this would be the case. Also, for example, the correlation between the
number of term-limited Democrats and the seniority of the Republican incumbent is -0.05, and the
correlation between the number of term-limited Republicans and the seniority of the Democratic
incumbent is 0.02. Since seniority is related to vulnerability (more vulnerable incumbents are less
likely to survive), the low correlations between our instruments and incumbent seniority suggest
that our instruments are also not correlated with incumbent vulnerability.
4.2.2 External Validity
Finally, we think that our ndings are informative beyond the senate races that we look at. Table
4.3 presents some summary statistics that help us make that case. The rst two rows show that,
in states with term limits, term-limited representative run in similar races as non-term limited
representatives. The partisanship, electoral safety, and incumbent seniority (in years) of these
races are similar. Obviously, the representatives are dierent in terms of seniority, since one group
was already term-limited while the other had not been yet.
The third row shows the same statistics for the senate races challenged by state representatives
in states without term limits. As one can see by comparing the rst two rows with the third, states
with term limits are only slightly dierent from the rest. To begin with, as one would expect given
the usage of term limits, the average incumbent has been in oce for a shorter period of time.
However, the average experience of the term-limited challengers in our sample is similar to that of
the state representatives that run for higher oce in the states without term limits. Also, in states
without term limits state representatives tend to run in districts that are \safer" for one party.
15If we construct our instruments dierently, capturing the number of term-limited representatives in one variable,
with dierent signs depending on their party aliation, then we reduce the number of instruments by half and we
get much higher F-tests. In this case, the F-tests would range from 27.7 to 62.2.
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Table 4.3: Summary Statistics of Senate Races Challenged by State House Representatives
District District Challenger Incumbent
Partisanship a Marginality b Seniority c Seniority d
States with term limits
- Term-limited challengers 0.490 0.110 7.92 7.92
- Non-term-limited challengers 0.480 0.136 4.93 8.62
States without term limits
- (Non-term-limited) challengers 0.482 0.168 7.41 12.82
a Democratic share of two-party voter registration (2008 data only).
b Absolute distance of two-party voter registration from 50-50 (2008 data only).
c Measured as previous years served.
d From cases where the challenger faced an incumbent.
In addition, we also examined whether the states with term-limits are unusual in other ways.
One key dimension is legislative professionalism, since it is likely that the incumbency advantage,
the eect of challenger quality, and the degree to which potential candidates are strategic is higher
in professional legislatures. Using the well-known Squire index (from 2005, midway through in our
sample), we nd that the states with term limits in our sample are slightly more professional than
other states { the average Squire index in states with term limits is 0.22 and the average in other
states is 0.17 { although the dierence is not statistically signicant even at the 0.10 level.16
4.2.3 Implications: The Scare-off Effect
As described in the introduction, one of the main causes of the incumbency advantage is the so-
called \scare-o" eect. Incumbents make an eort to deter serious opposition and ambitious career
politicians, aware of the advantage incumbents have, make strategic decisions about when to enter
a race. As a result, incumbents end up facing weak challengers and, thus, they win their re-election
bids with large margins. As Jacobson (2009) explains: \The electoral value of incumbency lies
not only in what it provides to the incumbent but also in how it aects the thinking of potential
opponents and their potential supporters. Many incumbents win easily by wide margins because
they face inexperienced, sometimes reluctant, challengers who lack the nancial and organizational
backing to mount a serious campaign for congress." (p. 45)
16See Squire (2012) for details about the Squire index. The range of the index used is [0.03, 0.63].
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Now that we have an unbiased estimate of the eect of challenger quality, we can now use it
to estimate how much of the incumbency advantage is due to incumbents scaring o high-quality
challengers. To do so, we follow Cox and Katz (1996) and dene the scare-o eect as:17
S = 2  [Pr(Qit = 1jIit = 0)  Pr(Qit = 1jIit = 1)] (4.3)
where 2 represents the eect that facing a high quality challenger would have in the vote share of a
candidate and the dierence in probabilities represents the eect that the presence of the incumbent
has on the probability of having a high quality challenger in the race. For our calculations, then,
we can use the coecient on Quality Challenger from the second-stage regressions (which is an
unbiased estimate of 2) and the coecient on Incumbency Status from our rst-stage regressions
(which is as good an estimate as we can get of the dierence in probabilities).
Table 4.4: Estimates of the Scare-o Eect in U.S. State Senate Races, 2002-2010
District Fixed Eects Gelman and King
Model Model
IV i IV ii IV i IV ii
Incumbency Advantage 0.058 0.052 0.084 0.087
(from Table 4.1)
Quality Challenger Eect on Vote Share -0.045 -0.036 -0.069 -0.075
(from Table 4.1)
Incumbency Status Eect on Probability 0.561 0.537 0.436 0.373
of Quality Challenger (from Table 4.2)
Scare-o Eect 0.025 0.019 0.030 0.028
Portion of Incumbency Advantage 43% 37% 36% 32%
due to Scare-o Eect
Using the estimates from Tables 4.1 and 4.2 we can construct Table 4.4, where we show that,
based on our calculations, the scare-o eect ranges from 2 to 3 percentage points of the vote and
represents between 30 and 40 percent of the estimated incumbency advantage. This is consistent
17What we call the scare-o eect is what Cox and Katz (1996) refer to as the \total indirect eect".
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with Cox and Katz (1996) ndings, who estimated that the scare-o eect comprised 29 percent
of the incumbency advantage in 1990, the latest year in their sample.18
4.3 Conclusion
In conclusion, our results indicate that state representatives strategically decide when to run for
higher oce, but that their strategic entry to the race does not bias the the estimated eect that
having a quality challenger has on the vote share, nor does it bias the estimated incumbency
advantage. This is probably because strategic entry is highly correlated with variables that we
can measure relatively accurately and control for (e.g., the district partisanship or \the normal
vote", and partisan tides due to midterm slumps, coattails, and other phenomena). In other words,
based on our results, the strategic entry by state representatives is not highly correlated with the
unmeasured \electoral vulnerability" of particular state senate incumbents. Otherwise, the OLS
and IV estimates would be quite dierent.
What does the estimated coecient on incumbency status represent? We have isolated incum-
bency from one component of challenger quality: previous legislative experience. Since previous
research on U.S. House elections suggests that the prior oceholder experience { especially state
legislative experience { captures one of the most important aspects of challenger quality our ndings
represent signicant progress. Other challenger attributes may matter however { prior service in
oces other than state representative, business experience, and leadership in community groups.
Thus, we cannot yet conclude that the coecient represents only average incumbent quality relative
to a \randomly drawn" challenger, plus oceholder benets.
What about portability to other contexts? As noted above, the states with term limits are similar
to the states without term limits in terms of partisanship and legislative professionalism, although
on average the senate districts in these states are more competitive than those in other states. It
is also possible that strategic calculations are dierent in states with term limits. For example,
some state representatives might prefer to wait until after the next redistricting to challenge a
state senator, but cannot do so because they will be term-limited beforehand. On the other hand,
compared to states without term limits, it is likely that state representatives in states with term
18Cox and Katz (1996) use the Gelman and King model for the estimations, thus, their results are comparable to
our Model 2 results.
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limits are more tempted to wait for open state senate seats, because state senators also face term
limits. On balance, it is not clear whether these dierences make it more or less dicult to plan
in states with term limits, but this would appear to be a fruitful area both for theory and future
empirical work.
In any case, our ndings can be taken as good news for many previous studies in the literature.
Our results suggest that the bias due to strategic challenger entry may be less of a problem in
practice than it is in theory, so the estimates in previous studies that \punt" on this issue might
not be seriously biased.
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5
Conclusion
After decades of research, we have yet to know whether incumbency advantage is a positive or a
negative trait of developed democracies. This dissertation aims to contribute to our understanding
of the sources of this phenomenon and, hence, their normative implications. While each of the
three papers of this dissertation provides some new insight about the topic, they also raise some
further questions, laying out my future research agenda.
In the study of mixed-system elections in Germany, Hungary, New Zealand, and Japan, I nd
that voters are more likely to vote for a party other than their own in single-member district
elections than in multi-member PR elections with closed party lists. Voters are more likely to cast
a strategic vote and, if the two electoral tiers are not linked in a system of compensatory seats,
voters are also more likely to cast a personal vote. In other words, I nd that by setting the rules
of the game and establishing dierent sets of incentives, electoral institutions have an eect on the
degree to which politics is party-oriented or personalistic. Further research is needed, however, to
determine the specic mechanisms by which electoral institutions aect the level of incumbency
advantage in the elections.
In the analysis of the elections to the Spanish Senate, I nd a small but signicant incumbency
advantage, estimated to increase the probability of all incumbents being reelected by almost 25
percentage points but that of vulnerable incumbents by more than 50 percentage points. I also
nd that the main source of such advantage comes from the behavior of the parties. In particular,
I nd that parties helped their more vulnerable senators get reelected by ensuring that they be
placed rst on the ballot. Since during the elections studied the law stipulated that candidates
be ordered on the ballot alphabetically, in order to ensure that incumbents be placed rst, parties
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had to nominate other candidates with last names further down the alphabet. In other words, in
this study I nd that even when the stakes are low, parties use whatever means available to them
to help their preferred incumbents get reelected. The mechanisms by which the parties help their
incumbents win is likely to change depending on the elections. In future research, I will explore
whether and how the actions of the parties are a source of incumbency advantage in other countries.
In the paper on the elections to U.S. state senates with term limits, my co-authors and I nd
strong evidence of strategic behavior by experienced challengers and estimate that between 30 and
40 percent of the incumbents' advantage is driven by them \scaring o" serious opposition. What
still remains unclear is what accounts for the remaining 70 or 60 percent, which is likely to be the
core reason why experienced challengers behave strategically and avoid facing strong incumbents
at the polls.
The literature on the potential sources of incumbency advantage has mostly focused on the activ-
ities that the incumbents personally engage in. In this dissertation, I establish that both electoral
institutions and the parties behind the incumbents have a larger role than scholars have given them
credit for. In addition, my co-authors and I nd that most of the advantage that incumbents enjoy
over their challengers cannot be explained by their facing inexperienced challengers. More research
is needed.
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Appendices
A.1 Appendix from Chapter 2: Voting for Parties or for Candidates
Table A1: Summary Statistics by Lower House Elections in the CSES Dataset
Party Electoral Feels Recalls Candidates Had Average #
Defection Formula Close None One >One Contact of Correct
in Lower & to a with a Political
House Voting Political Politician Knowledge
Elections Procedurea Party Last Year Answers
AUS 1996 0.29 3 0.83 0.16 1.59
0.45 0.37 0.37 0.96
BELF 1999 0.27 4 0.95 1.34
0.44 0.22 1.01
CAN 1997 0.51 1 0.50 0.32 0.22 0.46 0.22 1.78
0.50 0.50 0.47 0.41 0.50 0.41 0.97
CHE 1999 0.13 4 0.36 0.54 0.14 0.32 0.19 1.50
0.34 0.48 0.50 0.35 0.47 0.39 1.02
CZE 1996 0.25 4 0.49 0.42 0.21 0.37 0.08 2.03
0.43 0.50 0.49 0.40 0.48 0.26 0.99
DEU 19981 0.17 1 0.34 0.58 0.24 0.18 0.11 1.22
0.38 0.47 0.49 0.43 0.38 0.32 0.89
DEU 19982 0.17 5 0.34 0.58 0.24 0.18 0.11 1.22
0.38 0.47 0.49 0.43 0.38 0.32 0.89
DNK 1998 0.25 4 0.50 0.23 0.20 0.58 0.20
0.43 0.50 0.42 0.40 0.49 0.40
a Electoral Formula & Voting Procedure Categories: 1 = SMD-Candidate; 2 = MMD-Candidate; 3 = Majority-
Candidate; 4 = PR-Open Party List; 5 = PR-Closed Party List.
1 Denotes rst segment and 2 denotes second segment in mixed electoral systems.
Standard deviations shown under the means.
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Table A1: Summary Statistics by Lower House Elections in the CSES Dataset (Continuation)
Party Electoral Feels Recalls Candidates Had Average #
Defection Formula Close None One >One Contact of Correct
in Lower & to a with a Political
House Voting Political Politician Knowledge
Elections Procedurea Party Last Year Answers
ESP 1996 0.21 5 0.43 0.74 0.16 0.11 0.03 1.53
0.44 0.49 0.44 0.36 0.31 0.18 1.02
ESP 2000 0.05 5 0.42 0.75 0.14 0.11 0.03 1.53
0.22 0.49 0.43 0.34 0.31 0.18 0.83
GBR 1997 0.15 1 0.46 0.40 0.31 0.29 0.13 1.91
0.36 0.50 0.49 0.46 0.45 0.33 1
HKG 1998 0.20 5 0.08 0.34 0.21 0.44 0.04 1.86
0.40 0.27 0.48 0.41 0.50 0.20 0.92
HKG 2000 0.68 5 0.07 0.38 0.20 0.41 0.06 1.77
0.47 0.26 0.49 0.40 0.49 0.24 0.88
HUN 19981 0.17 3 0.35 0.37 0.23 0.40 0.07 1.22
0.38 0.48 0.48 0.42 0.49 0.25 0.98
HUN 19982 0.07 5 0.35 0.37 0.23 0.40 0.07 1.22
0.26 0.48 0.48 0.42 0.49 0.25 0.98
ISL 1999 0.23 4 0.51 0.17 0.14 0.70 0.31
0.42 0.50 0.37 0.34 0.46 0.46
ISR 1996 0.43 5 0.64 0.16 1.17
0.50 0.48 0.37 0.99
JPN 19961 0.28 1 0.38 0.06 0.14 0.80 0.08 0.52
0.45 0.48 0.24 0.35 0.40 0.27 0.66
JPN 19962 0.20 5 0.38 0.06 0.14 0.80 0.08 0.52
0.40 0.48 0.24 0.35 0.40 0.27 0.66
KOR 20001 0.20 1 0.27 0.08 0.51 0.41 0.16
0.40 0.45 0.28 0.50 0.49 0.37
MEX 19971 0.16 1 0.44 0.82 0.11 0.07 0.10 1.81
0.37 0.50 0.38 0.32 0.25 0.30 0.97
MEX 20001 0.21 1 0.52 0.87 0.11 0.03 0.09 1.52
0.41 0.50 0.34 0.31 0.16 0.29 1.07
NLD 1998 0.18 4 0.28 0.05 1.52
0.39 0.45 0.23 0.95
NOR 1997 0.15 5 0.52 0.31 0.18 0.50 0.15 1.45
0.36 0.50 0.46 0.39 0.50 0.35 0.91
NZL 19961 0.30 1 0.56 0.17 0.20 0.62 0.26 1.72
0.46 0.50 0.38 0.40 0.48 0.44 0.97
NZL 19962 0.21 5 0.56 0.17 0.20 0.62 0.26 1.72
0.41 0.50 0.38 0.40 0.48 0.44 0.97
a Electoral Formula & Voting Procedure Categories: 1 = SMD-Candidate; 2 = MMD-Candidate; 3 = Majority-
Candidate; 4 = PR-Open Party List; 5 = PR-Closed Party List.
1 Denotes rst segment and 2 denotes second segment in mixed electoral systems.
Standard deviations shown under the means.
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Table A1: Summary Statistics by Lower House Elections in the CSES Dataset (Continuation)
Party Electoral Feels Recalls Candidates Had Average #
Defection Formula Close None One >One Contact of Correct
in Lower & to a with a Political
House Voting Political Politician Knowledge
Elections Procedurea Party Last Year Answers
PER 2001 0.40 5 0.27 0.27 0.34 0.38 0.09
0.49 0.44 0.45 0.48 0.49 0.28
POL 19971 0.43 4 0.53 0.62 0.22 0.16 0.06 1.76
0.49 0.50 0.49 0.41 0.37 0.24 1.03
PRT 2002 0.17 5 0.47 0.81 0.10 0.09 0.06 1.41
0.38 0.50 0.39 0.30 0.29 0.24 0.87
ROU 1996 0.34 5 0.47 0.71 0.19 0.10 0.07 1.46
0.47 0.50 0.46 0.39 0.31 0.26 1.06
RUS 19991 0.14 1 0.62 0.31 0.17 0.52 0.03
0.34 0.48 0.46 0.37 0.50 0.16
SVN 19961 0.76 4 0.22
0.43 0.41
SWE 1998 0.21 4 0.53 0.67 0.23 0.10 0.11 1.71
0.40 0.50 0.47 0.42 0.31 0.31 1.03
TWN 19961 0.14 2 0.34 0.63 0.13 0.24 0.08 1.74
0.34 0.47 0.48 0.33 0.43 0.27 1.21
UKR 19981 0.27 3 0.69 0.61 0.18 0.21 0.08 1.87
0.45 0.46 0.49 0.39 0.41 0.26 0.87
USA 1996 0.18 1 0.57 0.48 0.25 0.27 0.14 1.55
0.39 0.50 0.50 0.43 0.45 0.35 0.81
a Electoral Formula & Voting Procedure Categories: 1 = SMD-Candidate; 2 = MMD-Candidate; 3 = Majority-
Candidate; 4 = PR-Open Party List; 5 = PR-Closed Party List.
1 Denotes rst segment and 2 denotes second segment in mixed electoral systems.
Standard deviations shown under the means.
73
A.2 Appendix from Chapter 4: Challenger Quality and the Incumbency
Advantage
Table A2: Summary of Term Limit Laws in U.S. State Lower Houses
State Number of Years Impact Period
Arizona 8 2000{present
Arkansas 6 1998-present
California 6 1996{present
Colorado 8 1998{present
Florida 8 2000{present
Louisiana 12 2007{present
Maine 8 1996{present
Michigan 6 1998{present
Missouri 8 2002{present
Montana 8 a 2000{present
Nevada 12 2010{present
Ohio 8 2000{present
Oklahoma 12 b 2004{present
Oregon 6 1998{2002
South Dakota 8 2000{present
a An individual may not serve more than 8 years over a 17 year period.
b 12 years total in the legislature (across both lower and upper houses).
Idaho passed a term-limit law in 1994 but repealed the law before it went into eect.
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